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Summary  findings
Xu and Wang investigate whether  ownership structure  Republic, 42 percent in Germany, and 33 percent in
significantly affects the performance of publicly listed  Japan.
firms in China and if so, in what way.  Their empirical analysis shows that the mix and
With public listed stocks, one can quantify the  concentration  of stock ownership do indeed significantly
ownership mix and concentration,  which makes it  affect a company's performance:
possible to study this issue. The authors use the recent  *  There  is a positive, significant correlation between
literature  on the role of large institutional shareholders  concentration  of ownership and profitability.
in corporate governance as a theoretical base.  *  The effect of concentrated  ownership is greater with
A typical listed stock company in China has a mixed  companies dominated by institutions  than with those
ownership structure, with three predominant groups of  dominated by the state.
shareholders  - the  state, legal persons (institutions), and  *  The firms' profitability is positively correlated with
individuals - each holding about 30 percent of the  the fraction of legal person (institutional) shares; it is
stock. (Employees and foreign investors together hold  either negatively correlated or uncorrelated  with the
less than  10 percent.)  fraction of state shares and with tradable A-shares held
Ownership is heavily concentrated: the five largest  mostly by individuals.
shareholders accounted for 58 percent of outstanding  *  Labor productivity tends to decline as the
shares in 1995, compared with 57.8 percent  in the Czech  proportion  of state shares increases.
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1.1. Objectives of the Paper
Restructuring  the state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs) has been  considered  as the key to the
success of China's  economic  reform  in the next decade. Two competing  approaches  have been
proposed:  the market  approach  and the ownership  approach. The first approach  is based upon a
believe that if the markets  for products,  for factors  of production,  and for corporate  control are
created and function  well, efficiency  improvements  of SOEs can be achieved  without  dramatic
changes in ownership. Proponents  of the second  approach  argue  that private ownership  is a
necessary  condition  for enterprise  efficiency. Reflecting  the two alternative  views, China has
adopted  a reform  strategy  that gives priorities  to fostering  markets  and nurturing  institutional
changes,  while  in Russia  and Eastern  Europe  radical  ownership  reforms  were put in place at the
early stage of reforms.
This paper  investigates  whether  ownership  structure  has significant  effects on the
performance  of publicly-listed  companies  in China,  and in what ways if it does.  Publicly-listed
stock companies  provide  a unique  opportunity  for the study  of this issue  since they allow us to
quantify  the ownership  mix and concentration. Over 500 companies  were listed  on the two
national  stock exchanges  at the-end  of 1996. These companies  are typically  owned by five
groups  of agents: the state, legal persons  (institutions),  tradable  A-share  holders (mostly,
individuals),  employees,  and foreign investors. The first three groups  are the main shareholders,
controlling  roughly  30% of the outstanding  shares  each. Employees  of the companies  and
foreign investors  together  hold less than 10%. The ownership  concentration  is high with the five
largest shareholders  accounting  for 58 percent of the outstanding  shares in 1995,  compared  to
57.8 percent in Czech Republic,  42 percent in Germany  and 33 percent in Japan.
,Publicly-listed  companies,  however,  represent  only a small subset  of China's enterprises-
-a clean and perhaps better performed  group of enterprises  which were chosen to be listed on the
two stock exchanges. These companies  started  more or less on an equal basis, since they
undertook  the same restructuring  process required  by China's  Securities  Regulatory  Commission
(CSRC)  before  their initial  public offering  (IPO). Accounting  systems  are converted  to
international  standards,  and the information  disclosure  has to meet CSRC's  requirements. These
companies  enjoy  a similar  degree of autonomy  as to what to produce  and what prices  to charge.
Clearly, they are not representative  of all enterprises  in China,  state or nonstate.  (For broader
studies see World  Bank, 1996  and Broadman  1995.) In other words,  our empirical  study suffers
unavoidably  from a sample  selection  bias. Therefore,  the results of our analysis need  to be
treated with caution and they apply  only to large  and medium sized  corporations. We make no
attempt to compare  this group with, and to apply  these results to, all state-owned  enterprises.
We begin  with a descriptive  analysis  of the stock companies,  the ownership  structure,
the internal  organization,  corporate  governance,  and the behavior  of shareholders.  Note that the
meaning  of ownership  structure is two-fold  in this paper:  ownership  concentration  and ownership
mix. We will then compare  the performance  of firms with different  degree of ownership
concentration  as well  as different types of shareholders.  For these  purposes,  we introduce  three
accounting  ratios,  the market-to-book  value ratio (MBR),  return  on equity  (ROE), and return  on
asset (ROA),  to measure  firms'  performance  or profitability. The performance  variables  are then
regressed on two concentration  ratios and three ownership  fractions,  respectively. By examining
the performance  of the listed  companies in the period  of 1993  to 1995,  we expect to find out,
3*  whether and in what pattern ownership structure affects the performance of stock
companies.  For example, does the degree of ownership concentration matter?  Is the
firm's performance negatively correlated with the proportion of state shares?  Or, do
individual shareholders monitor the management closely?  What about legal person
owners?
*  through what channels do shareholders influence the management and consequently
the firm's performance?
1.2  Summary of Results
Results from our empirical analysis show that ownership structure (both the mix and the
concentration) indeed has significant effects on the performance of the stock companies.  First,
there is a positive correlation between performance and ownership concentration.  Second, the
effect of ownership concentration is stronger for companies dominated by legal person
shareholders than for those dominated by the state.  Third, firms' performance is positively and
significantly correlated with the fraction of legal person shares, but it is either negatively
correlated or uncorrelated with the fractions of state shares and tradable A-shares mostly held by
individuals.  Last, we find that labor productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state
shares increases.  These findings suggest that small individual shareholders in China do not
monitor the management well, probably because of the free-rider problem (Grossman and Hart,
1980). Large legal person (institution) shareholders, on the other hand, appear to have played a
positive  role in corporate governance, which is consistent with the theory of Shleifer and Vishny
(1986).  The coefficients for the fraction of state shares are negative and significant, indicating
that the state ownership does not help improve firms' performance.
Parallel  to the empirical study, we present evidence in the descriptive discussions to
show that legal person owners can monitor the management effectively through their control
over the board of directors,  over the selection of corporate officers and the compensation of
chief corporate officers.  We argue that an active takeover market, which does not exist in China,
is not likely to the mechanism for shareholders to discipline the management.  In contrast,  in
most state-controlled companies, board members and top managers are appointed by the local
government and the local organization of the ruling party.  In addition, the state has set the goal
as "preserving  and increasing the value of state assets."  The goal is unfortunately not quite the
same as value maximizing of the firm.  As will be seen below, the state often takes activities that
are value-decreasing for the firm.
These findings, largely consistent with previous studies, suggest the importance of large
institutional shareholders in corporate governance and performance, the inefficiency of state
ownership, and potential problems in an overly dispersed ownership structure.  Comparative
studies (in Annex) show that in OECD countries ownership and control rights are increasingly
concentrated in the hands of financial and nonfinancial institutions. The driving force behind this
trend seems to be related to the benefit of ownership concentration as a direct measure of
corporate control, since concentration provides the investors with both the incentive and the
power to monitor and control the management.
The theme of this paper echoes some recent studies on large sharelholders'  activism in
industrial countries, particularly, in the U.S.  We survey these studies along with others in the
next subsection.
41.3. A Literature Sturvey
Empirical studies so far have presented mixed results related to the debate on the market
versus ownership approaches.  For the Chinese economy, Groves et al (1994) survey 800 SOEs
for an assessment of China's partial reforms.  It is found that profit retention, performance-based
bonuses, and management contracts have increased productivity of the SOEs.  In a separate
study, the authors present evidence from the same sample to show that the forming of the market
for managers has contributes to gains in output per work and total factor productivity (TFP)
[Groves et al (1995)].  Earlier, Jefferson et al (1992) report an average TFP growth of 2.4% for
SOEs over the 1984-1987 period.
In contrast, superior performance of town-and-village enterprises (TVEs) over SOEs and
much faster growth of the private sector are frequently cited as in favor of the ownership
approach.  Svejnar (1990), for example, find that TVEs had an annual TFP growth of 13% in the
1981-1986 period, 5 times as high as that of SOEs in the study of Jefferson et al.  Later, Woo et
al (1994) raise the question about how successful the partial reform of Chinese SOEs has been.
Taking into account changes in prices of inputs and outputs, they find that TFP growth in SOEs
is zero at best in the 1984-1988 period, but positive TFP growth in collectively owned
enterprises  including TVEs.
With respect to the US economy, results are also mixed.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find
no significant correlation between ownership concentration and accounting profit rates for 511
large corporations.  Morck et al (1988) report a piecewise linear relationship of Tobin's Q with
board member ownership for 371 Fortune 500 firms.1 Holderness and Sheehan (1988) analyze
114 NYSE- or AMEX-listed corporations in which a majority shareholder owns at least 50.1% of
the common stock.  Tobin's Q is higher if the majority owners are corporations, while Tobin's  Q
as well as the accounting profit rates are significantly lower for firms with individual majority
owners., McConnell and Servaes (1990) find for a sample of more than  1,000  firms that Tobin's
Q is positively correlated with the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors.  These
studies along with others seem to suggest: (i) There is a positive correlation between share
holdings of large investors and firms' performance; and (ii) institutional investors appear to be
more effective in monitoring firms' performance than individual shareholders.
Theoretically, both of the schools can find their roots in the literature.  Fama (1980), for
example, argues that if a firm is viewed as a set of contracts, ownership of the firm is an
irrelevant concept.  A properly-functioned managerial labor market may discipline managers and
solve incentive problems caused by the separation between ownership and control.  Hart (1983)
points out that competition in the product market reduces managerial slack, and thus provides
another disciplinary mechanism.  Jensen and Ruback (1983) emphasize the role of the market for
corporate control.  Martin and McConnell (1991) find that the takeover market has restricted
non-value maximizing behavior of top corporate managers.  On the other hand, economists argue
that ownership matters because it affects at least to some extent the working of the markets.  For
I Tobin's Q is in general  defined  as the ratio of the market  value  to the replacement  value of the firm,
which can be measured  as the market  value  of equity  and debts over replacement  value  of net fixed  assets
and inventory.  In this particular  study,  Q increases  as board  ownership  rises from zero to 5%, but
decreases  over the range  of 5%  to 25%,  and increases  again for companies  with  board ownership  over
25%.
5instance, Grossman and Hart (1980) show that if a firm's ownership is widely dispersed, no
shareholder has adequate incentives to monitor the management closely as the gain from a
takeover for any individual shareholder is too small to cover the monitoring cost.  Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) develops a model to demonstrate that a certain degree of ownership concentration
is desired in order for the takeover market to work more effectively.  Being able to capture a
chunk of the gains from watching the management, large shareholders supply monitoring at
levels that would be otherwise impossible to reach in diffusely-held firms.  Holmstrom and
Tirole (1993) show that under certain conditions, managers' optimal incentive contracts will
always include stocks (Proposition 2).  Zou (1992) constructs two conceptual firms that are
otherwise identical except one with absentee ownership and the other with cooperative
ownership.  He proves that even if firms are viewed as a nexus of complete contracts, the
ownership structure matters as the cooperative firm can achieve first-best production efficiency,
while the other cannot.
The studies by Grossman and Hart and by Shleifer and Vishny are particularly important
because they provide the theoretical foundation for this paper.  In their models, the governance
mechanism is outsider takeover, while in China direct control by large stakeholders seems to be
the means for shareholders to discipline the management.  Despite the difference, the public
good nature of shareholders' monitoring remains unchanged, and hence the same arguments
apply to the Chinese case.
II. Ownership Structure and Performance: A Descriptive Discussion
2.  1. The Emergence of Stock Companies and Stock Market3
Stock companies and stock markets did not exist until the late 1980s when the Chinese
government decided to restructure the industrial sector then dominated by SOEs.  A department
store in Beijing was given permission for issuing shares in 1984, the very first time since the
founding of the People's Republic in 1949. Shareholders were confined, however, solely to the
employees of the store.  A more direct cause of this bold step was the heavy losses incurred by
SOEs.  In the following few years, more SOEs were "incorporated" through selling shares to
their own employees or other stock companies and SOEs.  New joint stock companies were
organized in a similar way.  Stock trading was also prohibited and low liquidity of stocks made it
difficult for the companies to market their initial offerings.  Consequently, curb markets emerged
in several large cities.  To end the chaotic black-market trading, the State Council decided in
1989 to establish two national stock exchanges.  The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was
inaugurated in December of 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) opened in April,
1991.
The number of listed companies, trading volume, and total market capitalization has
increased drastically since the opening of the two exchanges.  The total number of firms listed
increased from 183 in 1993 to 323 in 1995 and over 500 in 1996. Total market capitalization
reached US$42.1 billion as of December 1995 (IFC  1996 and Table 2.1), or 6 percent of China's
2Admati  et al (1994) show, on the other  hand, that  while concentrated  ownership  promotes  monitoring,  it
decreases  risk-sharing  gains which  are usually  realized  with  more  dispersed  ownership.
3See  the World  Bank (1995) for a more  detailed  survey.
6GDP (declined from 8 percent in 1994).  Readers should not be misled by the figures, however,
when estimating the size of the Chinese stock market.  Shares are classified as domestic (A-
shares) and foreign (B-, H-, N-, shares) by holders' residency.  There are four subcategories of A-
shares: the state shares, the legal person shares, the employee shares, and the tradable A-shares
mostly held by individuals.  Only the A-shares held by individual and B-shares held by
foreigners are traded in the open market.  We clarify these definitions below.
2.2. Definitions of Different Types of Shares
The state shares are those held by the central government, local governments, or solely-
government-owned enterprises.  It is recently declared that the ultimate owner of state shares is
the State Council of China.  State shares are not allowed for trading at the two exchanges, but
transferable to domestic institutions, upon approval of CSRC.  In many of the publicly-traded
corporations, the state is the largest or majority shareholder.  The state has a controlling interest
in 66 (50) of 189 (168) SHSE-listed firms in 1995 (1994), and in 30 (28) of 137  (116) SZSE-
listed firms.
The legal person shares are shares owned by domestic institutions.4 A legal person in
China is defined as a non-individual  legal entity or institution.  In official documents, domestic
institutions include stock companies, non-bank financial institutions,5 and SOEs that have at
least one non-state owners.  Securities firms, trust & investment companies, finance companies,
and mutual funds are major non-bank financial institutions.  There is a sub-category called
"state-owned legal person shares."  It refers to shares held by institutions in which the state is the
majority owner but has less than 100% shareholding.6 Like state shares, legal person shares are
not tradable at the two exchanges, but can be transferred to domestic institutions upon approval
from the CSRC.  Sales of legal person shares to foreign investors had been allowed until it was
suspended in May 1996.  In 1995 (1994), 46 (41) SHSE-listed companies had legal person
shareholders holding more than 50% of outstanding shares, and the same figure is 34 (37) at the
SZSE.
The tradable A-shares are held and traded mostly by individuals and some by domestic
institutions.  There is no restriction on the number of shares traded, nor on holding periods.  It is
required, however, tradable A-shares should account for no less than 25% of total outstanding
shares when a company makes its IPO.  These shares are the only type of equity that are traded
among domestic investors at the two exchanges. The volumes reported in Table 2.1 are thus due
entirely to trading of tradable A-shares mostly held by individuals.
4The legal  person  shares studied  in this paper should  be carefully  distinguished  from the legal person
shares  traded  on two automated  price quotation  systems  in Beijing:  STAQ  (Stock  Trading  Automated
Quotation  System)  and NETS  (National  Exchange  and Trading  System). 17  companies  are listed  on STAQ
and  NETS. Companies  once listed  on STAQ  and NETS  cannot be considered  for listing  on the SHSE  or
SZSE,  and vise versa. In other  words,  cross-listing  is not permitted.
5Taking  the Glass-Steagall  Act of the US as a model, The Commercial  Banking  Law  of China that  came
into  effect in 1994  prohibits  commercial  banks from underwriting,  holding  and trading  securities  except for
government  bonds.
6 CSRC  defines  these shares  as legal person shares,  whereas  the BSPM interprets  them as state  shares. We
adopt CSRC's  definition  in this paper.
7The employee shares are offered to workers and managers of a listed company, usually
at a substantial discount.  These share offerings are designed more like a benefit to employees
than as an incentive scheme.  Employee shares are registered under the title of the labor union of
the company which also represents shareholding employees to exercise their rights.  After a
holding period of 6 to 12 nionths, the company may file with CSRC for allowing its employees
to sell the shares in the open market.  Only  10 (12) SHSE companies have employee owners in
1995 (1994), and the number is 121  (105) companies at the SZSE.
B-shares are available exclusively to foreign investors and some authorized domestic
securities firms.  The B-share market is separated from the A-share market, with SHSE B-shares
denominated in US dollar and SZSE B-shares in Hong Kong dollar.  H-shares are the same as
B-shares except that they are issued and traded at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Finally, N-
shares are listed on the NYSE, either through IPOs or as ADRs.  At the SHSE, 46 (37)
companies  have offered B-share or a combination of the three foreign shares, and 34 (22) at the
SZSE in 1995 (1994).
In theory, all the shares entitle shareholders the same dividends and voting rights.  In
practice, it is not uncommon that a company pays its state owner cash dividends, but offers
individual and legal person shareholders stock dividends and rights offerings.  This is because
new shares acquired by the stati cannot be traded either in the open market.  For liquidity
reasons, the state prefers cash dividends to stock dividends or rights offerings, and so do legal
person owners.  Regarding voting rights, tradable A-shareholders are in a disadvantageous
position due to the lack of proxy voting procedures, which we will discuss later.
A typical listed Chinese stock company has a mixed ownership structure with the state,
legal persons, and domestic individual investors as the three predominant groups of shareholders.
Each of the three holds about 30% of total outstanding shares.  Many listed companies do not
issue employee and foreign shares.  In those that do offer employee and foreign shares, they
account less than  10% of total outstanding shares. Table 2.2 shows the average ownership mix of
stock companies  listed at the two exchanges, in which FST, FLP, FTA, FEM, and FBS represent
the fractions of shares owned by the sate, legal persons, tradable A-share holders, employees and
B-share holders, respectively.  The proportion of state shares appears to have declined slightly
from 1993 to  1995, and so does the proportion of legal person shares.  The fraction of tradable
A-shares seems to be on the rise.  Note that all the ownership fractions have large standard
deviations, indicating large variations of ownership structure across firms.  On average, the state
ownership is higher for SHSE-listed companies than those listed on the SZSE, while legal
persons and individual shareholders seem to be more important at the SZSE.  Employee
ownership appears more popular in Shenzhen than in Shanghai.
Table 2.3 reports ownership structure of listed companies in 1995 by sectors, namely,
manufacturing, retailing, utility, real estate, and conglomerates as classified by the two stock
exchanges.  At the SHSE the state holds a large stake in manufacturing and utility companies,
while legal persons as a group are the largest shareholder of the conglomerates.  Tradable A-
share holders are the dominant owner group only in the retailing industry with a average interest
of 36.4%.  At the SZSE, the state lost its dominant position in all industries to either legal
persons as a group or tradable A-share investors as a group.  The average proportion of legal
person shares is greater in the retailing and utility industries than that of tradable A-shares.  A-
share holders are the most important group on average in the manufacturing and real estate
industries as well as for the conglomerates.
8To study the ownership distribution by firm size, we break down the samples according
to the book value of the companies' total assets.  The first bracket is for small firms with a book
value of total assets lower than RMB 500 million.  Firms with total assets between RMB 500
million and one billion fall into the second sub-sample, Medium (1).  The third, Medium (2),
goes from RMB one billion to 1.5 billion of total assets, and finally, those with total assets above
RMB 1.5 billion are identified as large firms.  For the SHSE-listed companies, the average
fraction of state shares rises steadily with firm size, and exceeds 50% for large firms.  This
probably reflects an official stand that the state should remain in control of key industries and
important firms.  The pattern is less clear, however, among companies listed on the SZSE.
In sum, there seems to be a tendency for the proportion of state shares to fall over time
and the fraction of tradable A-shares to rise.  The primary cause of the shift in relative
importance of different shareholders may have  been that the state prefers cash dividends to stock
dividends or rights offerings as dividends.  Second, the state has a larger presence, and a stronger
influence, in companies listed at the SHSE,  than those listed at the SZSE.  We now turn to
examine the intemal organization of the stock companies and the process of incorporatization.
We argue that direct control over the management by the board is the main mechanism for
shareholders to protect their interests in the Chinese stock companies.
2.3. Organizational Structure and the Process of Incorporatization
The organizational structure of a typical industrial stock company is demonstrated in
Figure 2.1.  On the top are shareholders.  According to China's corporate law, shareholders meet
at least once a year at either the annual conference or special shareholder conferences.7
At the annual conferences, shareholders
a  vote  on the company's  operating  strategy,  investment  plan, and other  important  issues  such
as changes  in registered  capital,  debt issuance,  mergers,  dissolution  and liquidation  of the
company,  and amendments  to the company's  bylaw.
*  elect  members  of the board  and the supervisory  committee,  and determine  the members'
compensations.
*  review  and approve  the annual  reports  by the board  and the supervisory  committee,  dividend
policy,  and the budget  for the next year.
The board of directors is the decision-making body of China's stock companies.  The
size of the board ranges from 5 to 20, and it is responsible for8
*  calling  and hosting  the annual  or special  shareholder  conferences,  and reporting  to
shareholders.
*  executing  resolutions  passed  by shareholders.
*  making  up the company's  operating  and investment  plans, dividend  policies,  and debt and
equity  financing  plans.
*  making  proposals  of merge, separation,  and dissolution  of the company.
7A special  shareholder  conference  may be called  when (I) the number  of board members  attending  the
annual conference  of shareholders  is less  than what the bylaw  requires;  (2) the company  has a loss
exceeding  one third of its owners'  equity;  (3) requested  by owners  with  more  than 10%  of the company's
outstanding  shares;  (4) requested  by the board  of directors;  and (5) requested  by the supervisory
committee. The Corporate  Law  of China, Provision  104.
gThe  Corporate  Law  of China, Provision  112.
9*  determining  the company's  internal  organizational  setup,  rules and regulations.
*  appointing  or replacing  top managers;  approving  nominations  of vice general  managers  and
CFO by the general  manager;  setting their compensations.
Figure  2.1. Organizational Structure of a Typical Industrial Stock Company
Shareholders
Board of Directors  . Supervisory Committee
General Manager
CGMI  VGM2  ...  CFO  CEN 
DEPTs  DEPTs  DEPTs~~  DEPTsl
Factories  Subsidiaries
VGM:  Vice  general manager. CEN: Chief  engineer. CE: Chief economist.
In comparison,  the supervisory  committee  plays a fairly  passive role in corporate
governance. It carries out the following  duties.9
*  overseeing  financial  operations  of the company.
*  watching  board  members  and managers  for violations  of the company's  bylaw.
*  correcting  decisions  by board  members  and managers  if they hurt  the interest  of
shareholders.
*  calling  special  shareholder  meetings.
*  supervising  board meetings.
The general manager  and vice general managers  (VGM)  are in charge  of the company's
daily operations. Each  vice general manger  has a couple of departments  in closely-related
operations  reporting  to him. The CFO is always the head of the accounting  and financing
department. The chief engineer (CEN)  is usually  the director  of the R&D  department  and the
department  of quality  control. In most of Chinese  stock companies,  VGMs,  CFO, and CEN are
board members,  but few are on the supervisory  committee. Putting  general  managers  of
9Ile Corporate  Law  of China, Provision  126.
10factories and subsidiaries  on the board is also a common  practice. Chief economist  is considered
a less important  position,  as an advisor  to the general manager.
The board of directors  is the most important  organization  in a firm controlling  the
selection  of top managers  and their compensations. Shareholder  must control  the board in order
to protect  their interest in the firm. The selection  of the board and supervisory  committee
members  becomes  critical in the forming  of new stock companies,  which depends  to a great
extent upon the founders'  administrative  affiliation  and their ownership  before  going public. The
firm's former  affiliation  also affects  the composition  of the board and supervisory  committee
(see below). China's  stock companies  are either created  by transformning  SOEs,  or launched  by a
group of legal persons,  and sometimes  by individuals. We  now explain how  these are done.
Incorporat&zation  of a SOE.  The State Planning Commission (SPC) and CSRC together
determine  how many shares in total shouldbe issued  each year, e.g., S billion for 1995. The 5
billion "total quota" is then broken  down  and allocated  among  provinces  and mega-cities  such as
Beijing,  Shanghai  and Tianjin. If a SOE  wants to be listed, it has to obtain an approval  from the
local government,  the State Economic  and Trade Commission,  the State Commission  of
Economic  Restructuring,  and CSRC. Once the SOE  has the permission  with a quota  of total
shares  to be issued, it begins a reorganization.  The first step is to separate non-productive  assets
such as schools  and hospitals  from productive  ones. Productive  assets account  for 50 to 75% of
total assets of the to-be-listed  stock company,  while non-productive  assets is left with the SOE.
All retired workers  also remain  on the SOE's  payroll. An accounting  firm is then hired  to audit
financial  statements  of the SOE  for the last  three years and the separated  productive  assets. In
the meantime,  managers  of the SOE  contact  other enterprises  and institutions  to see if they are
willing to be legal person co-founders'o of the stock company. The SOE  also talks intensively
with the local government  and party officials for candidates  of managers,  the board and
supervisory  committee  members. 80 percent  of such firms ends up with the arrangement  where
the original managers  and party  officials of the SOEs keep  the key positions  of the board and
supervisory  committee  in the new stock company.  No real restructuring  is done, and board
members  and officers  are almost exclusively  insiders. The nominations  must be confirmed  at the
first shareholder  meeting. The  confirmation  is nearly guaranteed  since  the state will have a
majority  holding  of the company.
After  the SOE receives  an approval  of the appointments  from its administrative
supervisor  and the local personnel  department  of the party,  the SOE finds a group of securities
firms as underwriters. On the day of IPO, at least  25% of total shares  are sold to the public,
whereas  shares classified  as state or legal person  owned  are kept in vault and cannot be traded.
After the IPO, the original SOE  either disappear  or becomes  the majority  holder  of the stock
company. In the former  case, the local office of the Bureau  of State Property  Management  (a
central  government  agency, BSPM  hereafter)  acts as the largest  shareholder  of the listed
company  if the SOE  was owned  by the central  government  or its agencies  before  the IPO.
Otherwise,  the local finance bureau,  or a local government-run  holding  company  plays the role
of the largest  shareholder. The incorporatization  of SOEs in China is thus being viewed  as
"nothing  different but the logo"  or "new  bottles with the old wine."
I°These  legal  person  institutions  themselves  may  be controlled  by  the  state. So long  as  they  are  not 100°/
owned  by the  state,  equity  they  hold  in  the new  stock  company  is  classified  as legal  person  shares.
IIFounding of a legal person dominated stock company. These stock companies are
formed in a different way that is more democratic with less government interference.  Even
though the founding legal persons have to get a permission for going public and a quota from
government agencies, they can, at least in theory, nominate board members and choose corporate
officers at their will.  It is not required to obtain a govemment or party approval of their choices.
Consequently, the board membership of stock companies founded by legal persons is less
concentrated than that of state-controlled corporations transformed from SOEs.  More
professional managers are hired by stock companies dominated by legal persons, whereas
officers of state-controlled companies are hand-picked by the government from a pool of party
cadres and former SOE managers, and sometimes on a rotation basis. I I
Only one listed company was founded by all individuals with no state and legal person
owners. From above description, it is clear that the incorporatization of SOEs is unlikely to
change the corporate governance of the firms.  For legal person founded stock companies, on the
other hand, we do see some progress toward a modern corporation.  At least, legal person
founders have greater autonomy in selecting board members and chief officers.
2.4. Composition of the Board and ihe Supervisory Committee
To assess the corporate governance of Chinese stock companies, we now examine the
composition of the board of directors and the supervisory committee.  Here we classify members
of the board and supervisory committee as representatives of the state, legal person owners,
tradable A-share holders, and non-owners by their present and previous employment.  Board and
committee members who have a full time job at the BSPM and local finance bureau, for
example, are considered as state representatives  in the company. 12
Summary statistics on the composition of the boards of 154  companies in 1995 are given
in Table 2.5.  A comparison of Table 2.5 with Table 2.2 reveals that the board membership of the
sample companies is not proportional to the ownership.  It is striking to see that individual
shareholders have no more than 0.3% of the seats on average even though they as a group
possess approximately one third of total outstanding shares.  On the other hand, the state is over-
represented on the board as 50% of positions are filled by government officials, substantially
higher  than its 30% of average stake in the stock companies.  Board membership for
management is common for both SHSE and SZSE companies, averaged at 50%.  The
management actually has a greater influence on decision making if we include lower ranking
officers such as general managers of subsidiaries in calculating the manager/board member ratio.
"  I  During  an interview  with  a state-controlled  stock company,  we were told that  about half of the board
members  and one  third of chief officers  are replaced  at the end of each term. Govemment  officials  are paid
better if they work  in the stock  company. To avoid  jealousy, the government  let officials  take tums to
serve in stock  companies.
12 Identifications  of the board  and committee  members  are difficult,  however,  for stock companies
transformed  from SOEs.  Even  though  a board chairman  is a full-time  job, he/she  could be either
appointed  by the local government  or elected  by shareholders.  To distinguish  between  these two
possibilities,  we look  at the members'  previous  employment. If he/she  worked in  the founding  SOE of the
company  before  its public  listing  and the SOE remains  the largest  shareholder  afterwards,  he/she is likely  a
govemment-appointed  board or committee  member. Hence,  we treat  him/her  as representing  the interest  of
the state. If the founding  SOE itself is defined  as a legal  person rather  than solely  state-owned,  he/she is
then considered  as legal person board  or committee  member.
12Next, we divide the sample companies  into two categories: the state-dominated and legal
person-dominated companies.1 3 Among the state-dominated firms, the state has more than 70%
of board seats on average and legal person owners take 20%.  Individual shareholders have no
presence at all.  For the legal person-dominated companies, the proportion is reversed, with legal
persons having 70% and the state 20%.  Individual and non-owner board membership is higher
for firms dominated by legal persons than for those dominated by the state.  It seems clear that
both the state and legal persons rely on their control over the board to influence corporate
policies and to protect their interests.
The composition of the supervisory committee is also characterized by extremely low
presence of individual shareholders, about 0.5% for the SZSE-listed companies and zero for the
sample companies listed on SHSE (see Table 2.6).  On the other hand, employee membership is
very high, 78% for the SHSE-listed companies, and 68% at the SZSE.  With so many employees
on the supervisory committee, it is doubtful that the committee can carry out its duties
independently and act in the best interest of shareholders.
Table 2.7 shows the shareholdings of board members and their cash salaries.  It is
interesting to note that for the SZSE listed companies in the sample, the average number of
shares held by board members is substantially greater for legal person-dominated firms than that
for the state-dominated firns.  On the other hand, board members of the SHSE-listed companies
that are dominated by legal person owners appear to receive a higher cash salary on average than
their counterparts do in the state-dominated firmns.  Roughly the same observation can be drawn
from the SZSE sample though the discrepancy in average cash salary is smaller.  We should be
cautious, however, about the informnation  on cash salaries of board members. 14 Nonetheless,
the differences in shareholdings and salaries of the board members between the state-dominated
and legal person-dominated firms are suggestive.  Many board members in the state-dominated
firms are still paid according to their administrative rankings, whereas legal person-dominated
companies have greater discretion in determnining  the compensation of their officers.
2.5. Shareholders' Behavior and Corporate Governance
For listed companies  in which the state owns equity, local offices of the BSPM or
officials of local finance bureaus exercise owner's rights on behalf of the state.15 The BSPM
collects dividends and submit them to the Ministry of Finance, while the local finance bureau
13 If a firm with  the fraction  of state shares  in total shares  outstanding  greater  than the fraction  of legal
person shares,  the firm is classified  as the state-dominated  regardless  of the fraction  of tradable  A-shares.
It is legal person-dominated  otherwise. In doing so, we assumed  implicitly  that individual  shareholders
have virtually  no say in corporate  affairs.
14  Data on salaries  are limited  and inaccurate. Only  33 out of the 71 sample  companies  listed  on the SZSE
provided  such information  and 52 of the 83 SHSE  companies  did so, even though  the disclosure  is required
by CSRC. As indicated  by interviews  with  a few  stock companies,  the salary figures  in annual  reports  are
not reliable.  There  are several  reasons for the reluctance  in reporting  board  members'  compensation.  One
is the concern  of possible  protest by shareholders,  especially  when the company's  performance  is poor.
Covering-up  violations  of salary ceilings  set by the state  could be another.
151n  a few cities  such as Shanghai  and Shenzhen,  government  investment  companies  are established  and
perform  all the functions  of BSPM. Little information  is available  on how these investment  companies  are
organized  and operate.
13can use them as a revenue of its own.  The top priority of the BSPM or whoever representing the
state has been stated as "preserving and increasing the value of state properties." I6  The BSPM
has two ways to ensure the implementation of the policy.  It can select board members and chief
officers, jointly with local party organizations, and it has veto power over business and
investment plans proposed by the management.  Officials of the BSPM may also simply choose
to sit on the board of directors or the supervisory committee.  It is unknown whether the BSPM
signs a contract with the management, and how popular such managerial contracts are among the
state-controlled companies.  For firms which the state is a minority shareholder, the BSPM plays
a rather passive role, just  acquiring one seat on the board or the supervisory committee.
A series of principal-agent problems may arise from this institutional setting in the state-
controlled stock companies.  First, officials the local BSPM may not have sufficient incentives to
preserve and increase the value of state properties.  They are civil servants and draw income
from the government payroll which has noihing to do with the performance of the stock
companies they oversee.  Moreover, these BSPM officials are appointed and paid by the local
government.  Priorities of the local government do not necessarily coincide with those of BSPM.
For instance, the local government may care more about unemployment than the value of state
assets. Knowing the local government's preference, the BSPM officials may forgo their efforts of
increasing the value of state assets, but align themselves with their local boss.  Since corporate
officers of state-controlled conmpanies  are also appointed, they are more likely to responsible
only to their party supervisors.  The promotion of the officers depends largely on how well they
execute the instructions from the top rather than the satisfaction of the BSPM or shareholders.
Firm's performance is secondary in importance, so long as it is not disastrous.
Second, it is difficult for the BSPM to verify what decisions made by the management
are (state assets) value-increasing and what are value-decreasing.  The BSPM bureaucrats are not
industry experts, and they have to overlook hundreds of companies and enterprises in which the
state has an interest.  Even worse, the value of state assets is not easy to determine.  Since stock
prices have been extremely volatile and contain a large noise component (see Xu (1996)],17 it is
thought of as unfair and inaccurate to evaluate state assets based on stock prices.  Reflecting this
view, the value of state properties is in fact defined as the book value of the fraction of a firm's
net assets owned by the state.  The book value, however, may have nothing to do with a
company's profitability and hence the company's net present value.  Under this criteria,
distortions in managerial incentives are almost inevitable.
Third, increasing the value of state assets in a firm may lead to conflict of interests with
other shareholders.  For instance, managers of state-controlled stock companies are all aware of a
special form of value decreasing: dilution of state shares.  When a proposal of rights offering is
under consideration for raising more capital, backed up by the BSPM, the managers and board
members will do whatever needed to block it.  The BSPM has no budget to exercise the rights (to
purchase the offered shares) as all dividend revenues are submitted to the Ministry of Finance or
local governments.  Since rights are usually offered at a large discount of 25 to 50%, state shares
16See, for example,  State Property  Management,  Vol. 2, p 100,  the Bureau  of State Property  Management,
1994,  The Economics  Press, Beijing.
1 7French  and Roll  (1986) show that 88% of price  return volatility  of NYSE  stocks  can be attributed  to
arrival of new information.  For the SHSE,  the information  content  of stock prices in the period  of 1993  to
1995  is lower  than 40%.
14will be diluted if the BSPM does not exercise the rights. There are other circumstances in which
the state promotes its interest at the expense of other shareholders.  The BSPM appoints party
cadres board members to ensure its control of the stock companies.  The appointment may well
be value-decreasing for legal person and individual shareholders as the party cadres lack
experience of managing a modern corporation.
The vast majority of China's individual investors are small shareholders and few are in
the list of the ten largest shareholders.  For those individuals in the top ten, their holdings are so
small, normally less than 0.5%, so that the companies do not even have to disclose their names.
0.5% may be a significant figure by American standard.  Consider the state, and legal persons as
a group.  Each owns approximately a 30% stake on average (Table 2.2), 0.5% by a single
individual is negligible.  Almost no individual shareholders are on the board of directors or the
supervisory committee.  There are a few exceptions (about five) where individual shareholders
have a board seat.  Most of them are the business founders and Hong Kong residents.  It is
conceivable that the dispersed individual ownership may give rise to the classic free-rider
problem [Grossman and Hart (1980)].  Small investors do not have the incentive or the capability
to monitor managerial performance.  The small shareholders' inactivism has also been further
worsened by block holdings of the state and legal persons.
Anecdotal evidence is available to support the hypothesis of free rider problems.  The
turnover ratios of the Chinese stock exchanges, for example, are extremely high, over 200% at
both exchanges in 1994 (Table 2.1), as compared to 67% of the US.  Since tradable A-shares
account for 20% to 30% of total outstanding shares, the effective turnover ratio may range from
700% to 1000%!  In other words, the average holding period in China is about I to 2 months
while it is 18 months in the US.  Apparently, Chinese individual investors are seeking short term
trading profits rather than dividend income or long term growth.  With such a short investment
time horizon, it is unlikely that small shareholders are willing and able to monitor the
management closely.  The rate of small shareholders' participation in the annual shareholder
conference is also very low.  According to an estimate of CSRC, the average number of
shareholders attending annual conference is around 100, while the number of shareholders of
listed companies ranges from 3,000 to 100,000. The state and legal person owners always sent
their representatives to the conference with all the expenses covered by employers.  Individual
investors can go only at their own expense.  Very often, shares represented by conference
attendants are too low to meet the requirement, and the board has to call for an emergency
shareholder meeting.
Legal person shareholders in China are not only better motivated, but also better
equipped with power to control and monitor the management.i8 Unlike individual investors,
representatives of legal person shareholders are elected to the board of directors and the
supervisory committee.  Besides their voting power on important issues such as the selection of
the management team and dividend policies, they have access to corporate inside information,
and the right to question chief officers at any time about operations of the firm.  The board also
has the privilege of calling for an emergency shareholder meeting, while individual shareholders
will have to assemble a coalition that represents at least 10% of the firm's equity to do the same.
18 As argued  by Shleifer  and Vishny  (1986, 1996),  large  shareholders  provide  at least  a partial  solution  to
the free-rider  problem  of small investors.  They  have the incentive  to monitor  the management  even  though
doing so will also benefit  other  shareholders.
15It emerges from the above discussion that the different forms of ownership may have
implications for corporate governance and the performance of firms.  It is natural to ask: How
does firm's performance vary withl  equity ownership of the state, legal persons, and individual
investors, respectively?  For example, as the proportion of state shares in total shares outstanding
rises from zero to 80% across the sample, do we expect performance to deciine?  These issues
are to be address in the next section.
III. Ownership Structure and  Firms' Performance: Empirical Evidence
Using pooled data for the listed companies, three years for each stock exchange, we first
run regressions of performance variables on concentration ratios without distinguishing different
types of shares.  This regression analysis is conducted to  investigate the free-rider problem of
small investors and the role of large shareholders.  Second, we examine effects of state
ownership, legal person ownership and individual private ownership on firms' performance,
respectively.  Employee and foreign ownership are not dealt with in this paper.  9 We find that
the market value and profitability of firms increase with ownership concentration.  The effect of
ownership concentration is greater for companies dominated by legal persons than for state-
dominated firms.  Regarding the ownership mix, firms' performance is found to be positively
correlated with the fraction of legal person share, but either negatively correlated or uncorrelated
with the proportions of state shares and tradable A-shares.
3.1. Data Description and Definitions of Variables
The data set includes all SHSE and SZSE listed companies for 1993, 1994 and 1995.
Major sources of information are listed as follows
(1)  Publications by CSRC, the SHSE and SZSE, and China's Securities Association such
as China Securities Annual Report, 1994, 1995 and  1996; SHSE Securities Yearbook,
1993, 1994, and 1995; and SZSE Fact Book, 1993, 1994, and 1995. Most of the
figures on ownership mix and accounting ratios used in the regressions are gathered
and calculated from these publications.
(2)  The Information and Statistic Department of the two exchanges.  They kindly provided
us daily trading data including open and closing prices, volume, and value.
(3)  1995 annual reports of listed companies.  We collected annual reports of more than 100
SHSE companies and for about 60 SZSE companies.  We rely on these reports for
information on the board and the supervisory committee, and the top 10 shareholders.
Using the information, we are able to study the composition of the board and the
committee, and to compute ownership concentration ratios.
(4)  On-site study of 6 stock companies.
We employ three accounting ratios to measure the firm's performance, the market-to-
book value ratio (MBR), ROE, and ROA.  In the empirical literature, Tobin's Q, the market value
19lnterested  readers  may refer to Kruse and Blasi  (1995) for a survey on employee  ownership,  and Bailey
and  Jagtiani (1994),  for example,  on foreign  ownership  in the Thai capital  market.
16of debt plus the market value of equity divided by the replacement cost of all assets, has been
used as a major indicator of firms' performance.  Since few of the Chinese stock companies  issue
debt securities, it is almost impossible to estimate the market value of the companies' debt.  At
the end of 1993, for example, only 8 of the SZSE-listed companies have their corporate bonds
listed on the exchange, and the number decreases to one at the end of 1994 (SZSE Fact Book,
1994, p9- 10). Information needed for calculating the replacement cost is not available either.
Smith (1996) reports that institutional investors in the US uses the market-to-book ratio to assess
performance when selecting target firms.  Similarly, we take the MBR as a measure of the
market performance of firms, while realizing that the ratio, though closely related to, is not quite
the same as Tobin's Q.  Even Tobin's, as agreed by many researchers, is a noisy signal.  Because
of the limitations of MBR, the profit rates, ROE and ROA, are employed as supplementary
measures.  Definitions of the performance variables, ownership fractions, and concentration
ratios are given below.
MBR: the market-to-book value ratio, share prices on the last trading day of each
year time the number of total outstanding shares divided by the book value
of equity.
ROE: return on equity, after tax profits divided by the book value of equity.
ROA: return on assets, after tax profits divided by the book value of total assets.
FST: the fraction of equity owned by the state.  FST equals the number of shares
held by the state divided by the number of total outstanding shares.  FLP,
FTA, FEM, and FBS are calculated similarly for the fraction of equity owned
by legal persons, tradable A-share investors, employees, and B-share
holders, respectively.  See Table 2.2 for summary statistics.
AI  O: a concentration ratio, percentage of shares controlled by top 10
shareholders.
HERF: Herfindahl index of ownership concentration, the sum of squared
percentage of shares controlled by each top 10 shareholder.
Table 3.1 shows that the ownership of Chin's stock companies is highly concentrated,
and more so in companies listed at the SHSE than those at the SZSE.  On average, the first two
shareholders control more than 50% for the SHSE companies, and close to 50% for those listed
on the SZSE.
Factors other than ownership structure may also affect performance.  To take them, not
all of them, of course, into account, we introduce a set of control variables.
DUMi, i=l, 2, ..., 5, for manufacturing, trade, utility, real estate industries, and
conglomerates, respectively.  These industry dummies are set according to the
classification of listed corporations by the two stock exchanges.  Let dij be the
element of DUMi, dijj=I if firm j is in industry i and dij=0 otherwise.
17SALE, operating sales in billion Ren Miii Bi (RMB in short, the unit of Chinese
currency).  It measures the size effect of firms.2 0
DAR, the debt/asset ratio, which equals the book value of debt divided by the book value
of assets.  In the US, debt financing has a tax advantage over equity financing,
and hence the market value of a firm with a greater leverage is expected to be
higher.  The direction of DAR's effect on the Chinese stock companies is
unknown at this point.
GROW, growth of net income.  Stocks of companies with high growth should be priced
higher in an efficient market.2 1
3.2. Owvnership  Concentration and Firms' Performnance
Let P represent performance variables, P=MBR, ROE, and ROA, and CR be ownership
concentration ratios, CR=AI 0 and HERF.  If ownership structure does not matter, we would find
no correlation between P and CR.  The null hypothesis is thus stated as
Hypothesis  1: (The irrelevance of ownership concentration) In any regression of
P, the coefficient of ClR  equals zero.
We estimate equation (I)  to test the hypothesis for the two 1995 samples.2 2
5
P =  XQjDUMi  +  ISALE  + +2DAR+ 43GROW + +4CR+  e  (I),
i=1
where  all Greek letters represent coefficients.  e is an error term with a covariance matrix Cov(ej,
ek)= 0 for j￿k,  and Var(ej)#Var(ek).  Since the variance of ej differs across firms, only
heteroskedasticity-consistent statistics are reported in this paper.  Estimation results of equation
(1) are given in Table 3.1.  Note that GROW is not included in the regressions of ROE.
Hypothesis I is rejected decisively as A 10 and HERF are significantly different from
zero in regressions of MBR.23 The correlation of accounting profit rates with the ownership
concentration ratios is much weaker.  HERF is significant at the 5% level in the ROE equation
for the SZSE companies.  Neither HERF nor A 10 has any explanatory power for ROE of the
20ln the literature,  the value  of total assets  or the replacement  cost of assets is used  to control  for the size
effect,  e.g., see Morck  et al (1988)  and McConnell  and Servaes  (1990). The value  of total assets  is tried in
this paper. It has lower  explanatory  power  than SALE,  and its inclusion  in regressions  of ROE  and ROA
some times  makes  the results  sensitive  to different  combinations  independent  variables.
211n  the studies  of Morck  et al (1988) and McConnell  and Servaes,  R&D  expenditures  and advertising
expenditures  as ratios to the replacement  cost  are incorporated  into regressions. These variables  can also
be viewed  as indicators  of future  growth. Unfortunately,  data on R&D and advertising  expenditures  are
not available  for Chinese  stock companies.
22We do not have  data on top 10  shareholders  for the 1993  and 1994  samples.
23Following  Demsetz  and Lyhn  (1985), we experimented  with logarithm  transformation  of A  10 and HERF
in estimating  equation  (I).  The results  are virtually  the same.
18SHSE companies.  Estimation of equation (I) with ROA yields qualitatively identical results (not
reported here) to those with ROE.
The significant impact of concentration  ratios on MBR is in support of the  Shleifer and
Vishny hypothesis (1986) that large shareholders may help reduce the free-rider problem of
small investors, and hence are value-increasing.  This explanation should be taken with extra
caution, however.  Notice that the majority of top 10 shareholders of the Chinese stock
companies are state government agencies and legal persons.  For example, in the 1995 SZSE
sample, only 7 out of 127 companies have individual shareholders in the top 5.  There are more
individual investors in the top 10, but the number is fairly small, 1.6 on average.  The percentage
of shares controlled by individuals in the top 10 is even smaller, with an average of 3.4% of total
outstanding shares for the  127 companies.  A 10 and HERF therefore measure mostly the degree
of ownership concentration by the state and legal persons.  Accordingly, the results in Table 3.1
should be interpreted as a positive correlation of MBR with the state and legal person ownership
concentration, rather than ownership concentration  in general.
The positive effect of ownership concentration on MBR suggests that an overly
dispersed ownership structure may not be the best way to improve economic efficiency of the
public sector.  It is premature, however, to conclude that the transition to a market economy can
be completed while maintaining control of the state over the firms.  From the above statistical
analysis, we cannot tell whether the effect is due to the state or legal person owners.  To
distinguish between these two groups, we divide each of the 1995 samples into two sub-samples,
the state-dominated as defined in Section 11  and the legal person-dominated.  Regressions of
equation (1) are implemented for each sub-sample so that we can see the effect of ownership
concentration by the state and by legal persons separately.  The results from the sub-samples are
reported in Tables 3.2 (a) and 3.2 (b).
For the state-dominated firms, HERF and AI0 are significant in the MBR equations
only, but insignificant in other equations.  In contrast, for the SZSE listed companies that are
dominated by legal persons, the concentration ratios are significant at the 1% or 5% level with
all the measures of performance.  For legal person dominated SHSE companies, HERF is
correlated with ROE and ROA, but not with MBR.  Interestingly, there is a strong positive
correlation between MBR and the proportion of shares held by all legal persons, FLP.  It appears
that the market recognizes the role of legal persons only as a group.  On the other hand, HERF
seems to explain the accounting profit rates better than A 10 does.  The correlation between A 10
and the profit rates is weaker for the legal-person dominated SZSE companies, and A 10 is
insignificant for the SHSE firms.  Since HERF weights more toward larger shareholders, it may
be the case that the largest legal person owner alone can exert sufficient influence on the
management without having to form a coalition with other shareholders.  In fact, if we replace
HERF with A  l, the percentage of shares controlled by the most important shareholder, in the
ROE and ROA equations, the results are essentially identical to those presented in Table 3.2 (a)
and (b).  Thus, the market value of a firm rises as ownership concentration rises for legal persons
as a group. Whereas for the profit rates, the largest legal person shareholder is most relevant.
The disagreement between the market and actual profitability of the firm seems to suggest
imperfect information of A-share investors or their lack of experience.
In summary, we find empirical evidence for the positive effects of ownership
concentration on firms' performance.  The positive effect of concentration is stronger among
legal person-dominated companies than with firms dominated by the state.  For the latter,
19ownership concentration does not affect the profit rates at all.  These findings have certain policy
implications for China's SOE reform.  They challenge the popular thinking of Anglo-American
model with dispersed private ownership as the most efficient way to transform a socialist
economy, but in favor of the Germany-Japanese model.  In the Germany-Japanese corporate
system, large institutional shareholders, including banks and corporations play a crucial role.
3.3. Ownership Mix and Firms' Performance
As discussed briefly in the introductory section, some economists argue that well-
functioning markets, the product market, the managerial labor market, and the takeover market,
are the key in establishing corporate governance, and ownership is secondary in importance at
most if not irrelevant.  We have already seen that ownership concentration affects the
performance of firms.  We further address this issue by studying the effects of ownership mix on
the performance of firms.  If ownership mix is irrelevant concept, we would expect ownership
fractions to be insignificant in regressions of perfornance.  We first test the irrelevance
hypothesis of ownership mix in this subsection, and then investigate how firrns' performance
changes with ownership mix if the hypothesis is rejected.
Let F be ownership fraction variables, F=FST, FLP, and FTA.  We test
Hypothesis 2: (The Irrelevance of Ownership Mix) In any regressions of P, F is
insignificant.
by estimating the following equation,
P =  ±ctiDUMi + +l  SALE + 42DAR + 43GROW + 44F + e  (2).
i=l
We use pooled data from six samples, three for each stock exchange for 1993, 1994, and
1995, respectively.  The samples include all listed companies except a few outliers.  Outliers are
identified in the following way.  If an observation falls outside the range of the sample mean plus
and minus two times standard deviation, the observation is dropped.  We start with simple
regressions for the six samples, one year  at a time separately, and then run pooled regressions
using the three-year data as a panel.14  Results for the pooled regressions are presented in Table
3.4.1 for both Shanghai and Shenzhen. The conventional least-square-dummy-variable  approach
is used in this paper in the pooled regressions, due to the characteristics of our data.25 This
approach is widely used in the literature of ownership structure and corporate governance, and
24  We are grateful  to Stjin  Claessens  for his suggestion  of using pooled  regressions.
25  The fixed-effect  and random-effect  models  are not used since first,  the former  is essentially  a dummy-
variable  classical  regression  model. The use of the model  would  reduce the gain in the degree of freedom
from panel data if the panel is short. A more  serious  problem  could arise  if there is little  variation  over
time in the independent  variables. Recall  that state and legal  person shares  are not allowed  to be traded  at
the two exchanges,  and transfer  of these shares  among institutions  are subject  to strict  rules. Consequently,
the ownership  fractions,  FST, FLP  and FTA  are fairly  stable  over  time with little  variations. Using fixed
effect  model  here would  mean many zeros for the explanatory  variables  in such a situation. Even for the
random-effect  model,  special  treatment  is needed  when  some of the independent  variables  do not change
over  time [see Greene 1993,  Hsiao 1986  and Hausman  and Taylor 1981  for details].
20allows us to improve the efficiency of estimation without incurring heavy cost of technical
complexity.
The hypothesis 2 is rejected immediately as the coefficients of three ownership variables
differ significantly from zero for the pooled regression in Table 3.4.1.  In all the regressions, five
industry dummies are included as control variables and their coefficients are positive and
significant at 1% level. Other controlling variables including SALE and DAR.  Dummies for
year  1994 and  1993 are included with 1995 as the left-out category.  In all regressions, FST, the
fraction of equity held by the state, has a negative coefficient, and it is significant in two out of
four regressions in the table.  Firns  performannce  is positively correlated with legal persons'
holdings as FLP is significant at the 1% or 5% level in all four regressions, whether the
performance is measured by MBR or ROE or ROA.  In contrast, the fraction of equity owned by
individual shareholders,  FTA,  has a significant negative effect oni  the market-to-book ratios for
the two stock exchanges.  Individual shareholders do not seem to have any significant impact on
the profitability of firms as measured by ROE and ROA.  The explanatory power of these
regression is fairly high with adjusted R-squared ranging from 14 to 40 percent. We obtain
similar results in simple regressions using data one year at a time, with somewhat lower t-
statistics and R-squares.
We then explore the effects of both ownership concentration and mix on performance in
Table 3.4.2.  Indicators of concentration, A5, AIO and HERF are included and they show strong
positive effects.  The impacts of ownership mix did not go away.  Instead, they become stronger.
The fraction of state shares has negative coefficients in all regressions and they are significant in
all ROE and ROA regressions.  Legal person shares have positive and significant effects on
performance, although the t-ratios are lower than those in Table 3.4.1.  Individual tradable A
shares have negative and significant impact in all MBR regressions but it is insignificant in ROE
and ROA regressions.
The 1993 Shanghai sample stands out as an anomaly when running simple regressions
and thus it is excluded in the pooled regressions.  Little cofrelation between ownership structure
and firnm  perfornance  were found in this particular year for Shanghai listed companies.  It is
conjectured that the insignificance of the ownership variables might have something to do with,
among many others, the efficiency of the secondary market.  A simple linear regression of share
prices on EPS and a constant yields a significant coefficient and an adjusted R2 of 0.80 for the
SZ 1993 sample.  The coefficient  is insignificant for the 1993 SH sample, and the R2 is merely
0.0 15.  It could be the case that stock prices at the SHSE in 1993 contain so much noise26 that
they cannot reflect the values of firms accurately, and hence the correlation between
performnance  and ownership structure breaks down.2 7
26As mentioned  before,  the turnover  ratio of the SHSE is more than twice  as high  as that of the SZSE,
indicating  tremendous  short-term  speculation  in the Shanghai  market. Xu (1996)  shows  that the variance
of daily stock price  returns  at the SHSE is significantly  larger  than that of the SZSE. Also  see DeLong  et al
(1990) for a theoretical  treatment  of noise trading.
27As argued  by Kyle and Vila (1992), noise  trading  may distort  the takeover  market, namely,  noise trading
could possibly  make firms with  good performance  takeover  targets,  and on the other hand,  camouflage
firms with  poor performance. Holmstrom  and Tirole  (1993)  show that optimal  incentive  contracts  should
always  include  managers'  holding  of stocks. It is conceivable  that if a company's  stock is mispriced
because  of trading noise,  the contracts  can be misleading. In these  two examples,  trading  noise blurs the
"true"  relation  between  stock prices and firms'  performance.
21It is possible that the market performance of firms is a nonlinear function of ownership
structure.  Stulz (1988) develops a model to show that the probability for a hostile takeover to
succeed decreases as managerial equity ownership increases.  At 50% of managerial ownership,
the probability of a hostile takeover is zero.  The model thus predicts a hump-shaped nonlinear
relation between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by insiders.  Following this
line of thinking, we will examine in the next subsection some of the existing hypothesis about
how ownership structure affects the value of firms.  Our discussion will be focused on two
issues: (1) In what manner do legal person owners affect corporate governance? and (2) Why is
the state ownership inefficient?
3.4. More on Thte  Role of Legal Person Shareholders
Most legal person shareholders have a stake considerably larger than any individual's
holding in the sample firms.  Large legal person shareholders almost for sure possess seats on the
board of directors and on the supervisory committee as well.  What are their relations with the
management--insiders, controllers or collaborators?  McConnell and Servaes (1990) find, by
imposing a quadratic functional form, that Tobin's Q increases with insider ownership until it
reaches approximately 40% to 50%, and declines slowly thereafter.  Their finding is consistent
with the prediction of the Stulz's model.  On the other hand, Morck et al (1988) point out that
managers  respond to two opposing forces.  Managers naturally tend to allocate a firm's resources
in their own best interests at the expense of outsider shareholders.  As management's equity
ownership rises, however, their interests become more aligned with those of outside
shareholders.  The curve that shows the relationship between firms' value and inside ownership
can be downward or upward sloping, depending on which of the forces dominates the other.
Morch et al report that Tobin's Q rises over the 0 to 5% range of inside ownership, and falls
when inside ownership goes from 5% to 25%.  Q increases again for board ownership greater
than 25%.
Following McConnell and Servaes, we run pooled regressions of the market-to-book
value ratio on fractional ownership variables and their squared terms plus a constant intercept.
The results are given in Table 3.5.  There appears to be a quadratic relation between the market-
to-book value ratio and legal person ownership for both stock exchanges in 1993-95. It is worth
noting, however, that the signs of estimated coefficients with FLP and FLP2 indicate a U- shaped
rather than hump-shaped curve.  The value of firms decreases with FLP when FLP is low, but
increases when it is high.  But this effect does not exist for ROE and ROA regressions.  When
running separate regressions, the relation between firm's value (MBR) and legal person
ownership remains U-shaped for the SHSE sample companies, with a minimum occurring at
FLP=0.33 in 1994 and at 0.32 for 1995. For the SZ 1994 sample, the squared term is significant,
but the linear term is not.  The U-shaped function seems to be consistent with the hypothesis of
Morck et al about how inside ownership affects firms' value.  When legal persons own a small
stake in a company, they may try to exert their influence on or collude with the management for
undertaking business operations or investments that will benefit themselves but harm the firm's
value in the long run.  When their equity holding in the firm increases, their goal coincides with
that of outside shareholders, i.e., maximizing the firm's value.  The market value of the firm
decreases first with legal person ownership as investors see the conflict of interests, and then
increases when outside shareholders anticipate the convergence of interests at high level of legal
person holdings.
22Note that this explanation does not imply a turning point of 50% at which legal persons
shareholders change their behavior. The mechanism the legal persons rely on for disciplining the
management in China is not the threat of a takeover as assumed in the Stulz's (1988) model,
which underlies the empirical work of McConnell and Servaes (1990).  Instead, being fired by
the board of directors seems to be a far more serious threat to the Chinese managers than an
outsider takeover.  In fact, active takeover markets do not exist in China since state shares and
legal person shares, which together consist of more than 60% of total outstanding shares, are not
allowed for trading at the two exchanges.  Even though state and legal person shares are
transferable, parties involved need to go through a tedious procedure and get their deals
approved by the BSPM, CSRC, and the local government.  In 1994 and 1995, there are 32 state
or legal person share transactions registered with the two stock exchanges.28 Most of the
transactions appear to have been conducted for reasons other than reorganization.29 In only two
out of the 32 cases, shares transferred exceed 50% of total outstanding shares of the company.  It
is doubtful that outsider takeovers have served as an important means for legal person
shareholders to discipline the management.
It is conjectured that legal person owners ensure managers to work in the interest of
shareholder through direct control.  Sitting on the board with a substantial portion of shares,
large legal person shareholders are able to change the management team.  It is worth pointing out
that legal person owners do not have to have 50% of shareholders to vote with them in order to
replace the incumbent management.  The number of shareholders of the publicly-traded Chinese
corporations ranges approximately from 3,000 to  100,000. The number of shareholders who
actually attend the annual shareholder meetings rarely exceeds 200.  Suppose the 200
shareholders represent 60% of total outstanding shares.  What the board needs to remove the
management is 50% or 2/3 of the 60%, i.e., 40% of total outstanding shares at most.  Proxy votes
are not available in China.  If a single legal person shareholder owns 30% of a firm, it should not
be difficult for the legal person to gain the needed 10% from other legal person shareholders who
attend the conference.  Thus the inactivism of small shareholders makes legal persons more
powerful a shareholder group in corporate affairs than their equity stake indicates.
Legal person shareholders have played a positive role in monitoring the management and
improving firms' performance, so long as they have a large enough interest in the firms.  They
depend on direct control from the board rather than a takeover market to enforce the
management into value maximization.  Their positions in the stock companies are probably
weaker than those of German [see, e.g., Gorton and Schmid (1996)] and Japanese banks [Prowse
(1992)], but very likely stronger than that of American institutional investors.  In the German
case, Gorton and Schmid present evidence that the performance of German corporations rises
with banks' equity holdings in the corporations.  Smith (1996) shows that even without board
seats, American institutional investors monitor firms in which they have an investment, and their
contribution to the firms' market performance is positive and significant.
We have noticed that the state is a large shareholder, yet, has negative or insignificant
effects on firms' value.  Why does the state behave differently from the legal persons?  Boycko
et al (1995) suggest that the government may pursue political objectives such as excess
2SSecurities  Market  Herald,  October, 1995.
291t  seems  that the transfers  were motivated  mainly  by cashing-out,  gaining  an access  to the capital  market,
and diversification  or consolidation.
23employment rather than profit maximization.  Focusing on managerial incentive schemes,
Laffont and Tirole (1991) also point out that conflicts between the government's and
shareholders' goals are a source of inefficiency.  Unfortunately, we are unable, constrained by
limited data, to test the hypothesis of conflict-of-interest, but address the issue indirectly in the
next subsection and provide further evidence.
3.5. The Inefficiency of State Ownership
If employment is one of the government's objectives, the more are the stock companies
dominated by the state, the more workers should they hire, ceteris paribus, and the lower the
labor productivity.  Since the CSRC does not require listed companies to report the number of
workers hired, it is difficult to collect employment  data. The data set used in this study is
obtained from the SHSE, but observations are available only for 100 SHSE companies as of the
end of 1993. Using the data set, we estimate the following equation for the 100 firms
1og(L=)  ai  + Pilog(L)  + yF. + u.  (3)
L.  Lj 
where i=1, 2, ..., 5 for the five industries as classified by the SHSE.  Yj is the before tax profits
of firm j.  Kg stands for capital stock of firm j, equal to the book value of total assets.  L-
represents the number of employees.  ai  is the dummy variable included to reflect differences in
the labor productivity across industries  K-/L- is the capital-labor ratio.  The equation  looks like
but cannot be interpreted as a production furnction,  because the dependent variable is not value-
added per worker but the average profits created by each employee.  We argue that profit per
work is a better indicator for the purpose of testing whether the state pursues excess
employment.  If  were value added,  higher employment would increase Yj and L-
simultaneously, and hence the variations of the dependent variable would be smaller.  It would
be more difficult to detect the correlation, if it exists, between labor productivity and the state
ownership.  F, an equity fraction variable, enters equation (3) to capture the effect of certain type
of ownership on the labor productivity.  Estimation results of are given in Table 3.6.
The first two lines of Table 3.6 report estimates of the coefficients in equation (3) for
F=FST.  Ai  is negative and differs significantly from zero at the 5% level. The negative
correlation of the labor productivity with the state ownership does not contradict the hypothesis
that employment is one of the state's objectives.  It also reinforces the results obtained earlier,
i.e., the state ownership has an adverse effect on the performance of firms.  Lines 3 and 4 in
Table 3.6 show the estimation of equation (3) when F=FLP.  Not surprisingly, the coefficient is
positive and significant at the 5% level. The labor productivity is higher, the greater the stake of
legal person owners have in the stock companies.  Assuming the level of employment does not
change, we estimate equation (3) for the same  100 firms in 1994, and report the estimated
coefficients in the second half of Table 5.  The results are virtually identical to those of 1993: the
labor productivity falls with state ownership, but rises with legal person equity holdings.
The inefficiency of state ownership can arise from conflict interests between the central
government agency, BSPM, and other shareholders.  When a company needs to raise new capital
through rights offerings, the BSPM and its representatives on the board will vote against it as the
offerings will likely dilute state shares.  The blockage by the state may cost the firm investment
24opportunities and hurt its long term growth.  If this is true, we expect to see that the debt/asset
ratio, DAR, tends to be higher in state-dominated companies, but lower for those under strong
influence of legal person shareholders.  To see if this is the case, we regress DAR on five
industry dummies and ownership fraction variables, mainly, FST and FLP. Table 3.7
summarizes the testing results.  For the SH samples, the coefficients associated with FST are all
positive and significant at the 1% level, and those of FLP are significant and have an negative
sign as expected.  The correlation between the debt/asset ratio and ownership structure at the
SZSE is weaker, indicating, perhaps, a relatively weaker influence of the state on corporate
policies.  The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that companies in which the state has a
large stake may have to rely more heavily on debt financing as the state in general opposes rights
offerings.30
IV. Conclusions
Empirical evidence presented in this paper points to the inefficiencies related to the state
ownership, and to the importance of relative ownership concentration and the role of large and
institutional shareholders (blockholders).  First, market-oriented reform measures China has
adopted seem to have improved the economic efficiency of the state sector.  However, optimal
resource allocation is unlikely to be achieved simply by creating markets for products, workers
and managers, without changirng  the ownership structure of SOEs.  The internal incentive
structure of SOEs must be reformed by diversifying the state ownership, by introducing other
forms of large stakeholders  including institution investors.  It would be a Pareto improvement if
the government reduces or sells off the shares it holds in the stock companies.
Second, if ownership diversification is needed, is dispersed private ownership then the
answer for large and medium sized enterprises in China?  Our results seem to suggest a negative
answer.  Evidence show that the influence of individual shareholders to firm's profitability is
insignificant, if not completely irrelevant.  In many cases,  the coefficients for the fraction of
equity held by individual investors are significant but negative,  indicating that the market values
individual private ownership downward.  Apparently, these publicly-traded corporations  in
China suffer from the traditional free-ride problem.  Individual shareholders have no incentive
and no capability to monitor and influence the behavior of the management. Therefore, a certain
degree of ownership concentration  is needed.
Third, we found a positive correlation between ownership concentration and firms'
performance.  In particular firms'  profitability is positively and significantly correlated with the
fraction of legal person shares, suggesting that large legal person shareholders (institutional
investors) have the incentive as well as the power to monitor and control the behavior of the
management, and have played a significant role in corporate governance.  The result is robust
when indicators of both concentration and ownership mix are included in the regressions.  The
results are largely consistent with those of Claessens (1995) and Claessens, Djankov and Pohl
(1996).
30 In the literature,  the effects of financial  leverage  on firms' value  can be offsetting. It is positive  with  a
higher  debt/asset  ratio if taking into account  the value  of corporate  tax shields,  and negative  according  to
the pecking  order theory. The hypothesis  proposed  here  about the conflict  interests  of the state and other
shareholders  implies  that  the value  of firms is inversely  related with  financial  leverage. The overall  effect
of the debt/asset  ratio depends  upon which  of the factors  dominate  the opposing  ones.
25Comparative  studies  show  that  in OECD countries  ownership  and  control rights are
increasingly  concentrated  in the hands  of financial  and nonfinancial  institutions  (Annex) The
driving force  behind  this trend seems  to be  related  to the benefit  of ownership  concentration  as  a
direct measure  of corporate  control and  other factors. Looking at the determinants  of corporate
control mecnanisms,  many studies  argue  convincingly that the role of large institutions  in
corporate  governance  is particularly important  in countries  where  legal  protection  of
shareholders'  interest  is weak for historical  and  institutional reasons--  a situation  exists  in many
transition  economies.
Cautions  are needed  in interpreting  the results. First, this study  uses  a subsample  of
Chinese  enterprises--a  clean  and  perhaps  better  performed  group of enterprises  which were
chosen  to be listed  on the  two stock  exchanges.  Our empirical study suffers  unavoidably  from a
sample  selection  bias. Therefore,  the results  need  to be treated  with caution  and  they  apply only
to large  and  medium  sized  corporations.  Second,  it is suggested  that there could  be  endogenuity
of ownership  in transition economies  -- it could be  the case  that institution owners  can  choose  to
buy shares  in better  performing firms, and leave  all poorly performing  ones  in the hands  of the
state. We argue  that this is not likely in China where  the state  has  the control over  which
company  to be listed  and how many  shares  to be  kept in the hands  of the state. Unlike the case
in Eastern  and  Central  Europe,  legal  person  owners  have  less  power in China but  the state  has  the
power to select. If there is endogenuity  of ownership,  it is inconceivable  that  the state  would
select  to keep  the  shares  in poorly performing  firms (as  implies  by our results). Nonetheless,  this
issue  and  many  others  need  to be  tested  in future studies. This study  could  also  be
complemented  by more general  studies  using  random  samples  of Chinese  enterprises  as  well as
quantifiable  indicators  of ownership  mix, which is the intention  of several  ongoing  research
efforts that we know of.
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29Table 2.1. Selected  Market  Statistics  (as of the end of year, million  RMB*)
No. of Firms  Market Cap.  %of  GDP  Trading Value  Turnover
1992
SHSE  30  52,055  23,273  44.7%
SZSE  29  45,475  41,817  92.0%
Total  59  97,530  4.0
1993
SHSE  101  206,766  230,150  110.3%
SZSE  76  124,246  126,087  101.5%
Total  177  331,Q12  10.5
1994
SHSE  171  248,354  562,673  226.6%
SZSE  120  103,250  237,635  230.2%
Total  291  351,604  8.0
Market Cap.=Total market capitalization
=Market price x the number of total outstanding shares.
% of GDP = Total market capitalization as percentage of nominal GDP.
Turnover = Trading value/Total market capitalization.
Sources: For 1992: Shanghai Securities Yearbook,  1993, p400; China Securities Market Annual
Report,  1993, p 161.
For 1993: Securities Market Yearbook of China,  1994,  p809.
For 1994: China Securities Yearbook, 1995, p72, 73, p82.
*The exchange rate varies in the 3 years from USS l .0=BMB 8.1 to RMB 8.7.
Table  2.2. Ownership  Structure  of SHSE- and SZSE-Listed  Companies*
As of the end of year  (%)
FST  FLP  FTA  FEM  FBS
SHSE  1993  35.3  31.0  25.5  0.9  7.1
(28.6)  (28.7)  (19.3)  (2.6)  (13.2)
1994  34.6  29.7  28.0  0.8  6.9
(27.5)  (28.8)  (19.8)  (3.0)  (13.7)
1995  34.2  27.4  28.5  0.4  6.3
(26.9)  (27.1)  (19.5)  (1.9)  (13.5)
SZSE  1993  32.1  27.7  28.8  4.3  7.2
(27.3)  (23.4)  (14.7)  (5.4)  (16.8)
1994  28.2  33.5  32.9  2.0  3.4
(26.5)  (26.0)  (13.9)  (4.4)  (7.8)
1995  27.7  29.9  34.5  0.4  6.0
(25.3)  (23.7)  (14.2)  (2.1)  (12.9)
*Cross-firr  averages with standard deviations in parentheses.
30Table 2.3. Ownership Structure by Sector (1995)*
No. of Firms  FST  FLP  FTA  FEM  FBS
SHSE
Manufacturing  107  37.1  24.8  26.8  0.3  7.4
(27.5)  (27.3)  (18.9)  (1.7)  (14.1)
Retailing  33  32.2  25.0  36.4  0.7  2.3
(20.5)  (18.8)  (14.1)  (2.7)  (9.5)
Utility  12  36.3  34.8  21.9  0.0  4.0
(29.0)  (27.4)  (14.7)  (0.0)  (13.7)
Real Estate  9  30.5  29.3  26.1  0.0  9.3
(28.5)  (31.3)  (29.0)  (0.0)  (13.9)
Conglomerate  23  20.0  42.4  34.3  0.5  1.5
(28.4)  (31.7)  (22.2)  (2.3)  (5.7)
SZSE
Manufacturing  69  30.9  25.5  33.5  0.5  7.5
(24.9)  (23.0)  (13.9)  (2.5)  (14.8)
Retailing  I  18.0  40.0  38.4  0.1  3.0
(16.0)  (15.6)  (13.6)  (0.1)  (9.8)
Utility  13  24.6  36.7  28.4  0.1  8.7
(28.7)  (23.3)  (14.7)  (0.1)  -(15.1)
Real Estate  20  27.9  33.7  35.7  0.7  1.9
(29.4)  (27.1)  (13.4)  (2.5)  (4.7)
Conglomerate  14  22.5  32.5  39.6  0.1  4.2
(24.3)  (25.1)  (15.5)  (0.  )  (8.9)
*Cross-firm averages with standard deviations in parentheses.  Calculated from Shanghai Stock
Exchange Statistics Annual, 1995, and Fact Book of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 1995.
31Table 2.4. Ownership Structure by Firm Size (1995)*
No. of  FST  FLP  FTA  FEM  FBS
Firms
SHSE
Small (<500 mn)  77  28.11  31.4  36.1  0.2  2.2
(24.1)  (26.0)  (17.7)  (1.4)  (8.7)
Medium 1(500mn-Ibn)  43  31.9  26.3  32.1  0.4  6.7
(28.4)  (27.6)  (22.6)  (1.9)  (14.6)
Medium 2 (1-1.5bn)  38  35.0  31.7  21.4  0.7  9.3
(28.0)  (28.7)  (13.9)  (3.1)  (15.2)
Large  (1.5bn and over)  26  51.7  14.5  14.7  0.2  8.4
(24.3)  (24.4)  (12.1)  (0.7)  (13.5)
SZSE
Small (<500 mn)  31  32.3  28.7  32.8  0.1  4.5
(24.0)  (23.6)  (12.2)  (0.1)  (11.3)
Medium 1 (500mn-lbn)  46  24.1  33.4  38.7  0.1  2.4
- (23.7)  (24.9)  (13.4)  (0.1)  (8.1)
Medium 2(lbn-1.5bn)  32  24.3  32.8  32.7  0.4  7.5
(26.4)  (23.9)  (13.1)  (1.9)  (14.5)
Large (1.5bn and over)  18  35.4  18.2  29.7  1.6  15.0
(28.8)  (16.9)  (18.7)  (4.8)  (17.8)
*Firm size is classified by the book value of their total assets.  Cross-firm averages with standard
deviations in parentheses.  Calculated from Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annual, 1995, and Fact
Book of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 1995.
Table  2.5. Composition of the Board (%)
No. of  State  Legal  Public  Non-Owner  Manage-  Largest
Firms  Person  Individual  ment  Shareholder
SHSE  83  51.0  39.6  0.2  9.3  48.7
(40.0)  (37.5)  (1.2)  (15.6)  (18.1)
State-  48  74.4  19.5  0.0  6.1  74.3
dominated  (26.2)  (23.7)  (0.0)  (11.6)  (24.0)
Legal person  35  19.2  68.4  0.2  12.2  54.4
dominated  (32.6)  (32.3)  (1.2)  (14.3)  (26.3)
SZSE  71  50.9  39.1  0.3  9.7  50.5  60.5
(38.3)  (33.1)  (1.8)  (17.4)  (26.4)  (34.2)
State-  46  71.7  23.9  0.0  4.4  55.1  69.1
dominated  (25.7)  (23.9)  (0.0)  (10.9)  (24.0)  (27.7)
Legal person  25  12.5  67.1  0.8  19.6  45.5  45.8
dominated  (25.8)  (29.4)  (2.9)  (22.6)  (28.9)  (39.5)
*Cross-firm averages with standard deviations in parentheses. Calculated form 1995 annual
reports of listed companies.
32Table 2.6. Composition of the Supervisory Committee (%)*
No. of  State  Legal Person  Public Individual  Non-Owner  Employee
Firms
SHSE  83  56.9  32.7  0.0  10.4  77.7
(44.3)  (41.4)  (0.0)  (19.8)  (27.0)
State-  48  82.1  11.1  0.0  6.8  84.8
dominated  (30.5)  (24.2)  (0.0)  (14.3)  (22.1)
Legal Person  35  19.8  64.9  0.0  15.3  65.8
dominated  (33.8)  (41.1)  (0.0)  (24.6)  (31.1)
SZSE  7 1  50.9  39.1  0.3  9.7  50.5
(38.3)  (33.1)  (1.8)  (17.4)  (26.4)
State-  46  71.7  23.9  0.0  4.4  55.1
dominated  (25.7)  (23.9)  (0.0)  (10.9)  (24.0)
Legal Person  25  12.5  67.1  0.8  19.6  45.5
dominated  (25.8)  (29.4)  (2.9)  (22.6)  (28.9)
*Cross-firm averages with standard deviations in parentheses.  Calculated form 1995 annual
reports of listed companies.  Sources: Annual reports of listed companies.
Table 2.7. Average Shareholding and Cash Salary of Board Members*
Members of the Board of  Member of the Supervisory
Directors  Committee
Shareholding  Salary (RMB)  Shareholding  Salary (RMB)
SHSE
State-dominated  4,971  24,242  3,080  17,942
(3,622)  (14,669)  (1,985)  (9,373)
[48]  [36]  [481  [35]
Legal person-  5,704  40,612  2,519  26,754
dominated  (5,998)  (16,647)  (3,478)  (14,200)
[35]  [16]  [35]  [13]
SZSE
State-dominated  11,446  38,680  5,726
(10,568)  (65,350)  (5,605)
[46]  [20]  [46]
Legal person-  18,745  41,446  7,265
dominated  (15,562)  (29,033)  (8,092)
[25]  [13]  [25]
*Cross-firm averages with standard deviations in parentheses and the number of firms in brackets.
Calculated form 1995 annual reports of listed companies.
3.Table 3.1. Ownership Concentration:
Percentage of Shares Controlled by the Top 10 Share Holders (1995)*
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
SHSE  46.09  6.83  2.88  1.61  1.15  0.84  0.66  0.54  0.47  0.36
(18.4)  (7.95)  (3.86)  (1.98)  (1.34)  (1.01)  (0.80)  (0.66)  (0.60)  (0.50)
SZSE  40.11  8.93  4.08  2.60  1.85  1.32  1.07  0.88  0.78  0.65
(17.4)  (8.22)  (3.71)  (2.37)  (1.69)  (1.03)  (0.84)  (0.68)  (0.65)  (0.68)
*Cross-firm averages with standard deviation in parentheses.
Sources: Annual reports of listed companies.
Table 3.2. Ownership Concentration and Firms' Performance (1995)*
DUM**  SALE  DAR  GROW  AIO  HERF  Adj. R2 F-Stat.
SHSE
MBR  Yes  0 00a  1 18b  0002a  2.1 Ia  0.29  10.4
(-3.92)  (2.49)  (2.85)  (3.10)
MBR  Yes  0 . 00 a  HI I b  0.02b  1.48b  0.27  9.41
(-4.11)  (2.38)  (2.13)  (2.05)
ROE  Yes  0.00b  -0.45  0.49  0.05  2.49
(2.37)  (-0.10)  (0.13)
ROE  Yes  0.00 b  -0.62  1.41  0.05  2.51
(2.37)  (-0.13)  (0.33)
SZSE
MBR  Yes  -0 33 a  O.92a  0 .33a  0. 0 2a  0.38  10.5
(-3.64)  (-3.54)  (3.99)  (5.86)
MBR  Yes  -0 30a  0.76b  0 .35a  1 16 b  0.26  6.66
(-2.98)  (2.49)  (4.11)  (2.56)
ROE  Yes  0.09a  -0 1ob  0.00  0.25  7.07
(5.22)  (-2.59)  (1.63)
ROE  Yes  0.0 9a  -0.12a  0. 13b  0.27  7.62
(5.09)  (-2.94)  (1.98)
*t-statistics  are in parentheses.
**Most industry dummies are significant at the  1% level, but not reported here.
34Table 3.3.1 Ownership Concentration and Firms' Performance
for the State- and Legal Person-Dominated Subsamples (SHSE  1995)*
DUM**  SALE  DAR  GROW  AIO  HERF  FST  Adj. R2 F-Stat.
State-dominated (No. of Firms=1 10)
MBR  Yes  -0.00a  0.59  0.00  2.22a  0.41  10.5
(-3.00)  (0.87)  (0.94)  (2.89)
MBR  Yes  .o 00a  0.46  0.00  1.44b  0.39  9.89
(-3.20)  (0.66)  (0.92)  (2.27)
MBR  Yes  . 00 0 b  0.43  0.15  1. 92b  0.41  10.4
(-2.06)  (0.59)  (0.74)  (2.57)
ROE  Yes  0.00b  7.33  -5.53  0.10  2.73
(2.09)  (1.19)  (-1.12)
ROE  Yes  O.00b  7.77  -4.87  0.10  2.75
(2.28)  - (1.24)  (-1.19)
Legal Person-dominated (No. of Firms=70)
DUM**  SALE  DAR  GROW  AIO  HERF  FLP  Adj. R2 F-Stat.
MBR  Yes  - 0.00a  1.53c  0.02a  3.24c  0.21  3.24
(-4.09)  (1.91)  (2.77)  (1.91)
MBR  Yes  0 . 00 a  1.77b  0.02a  2.32  0.15  2.56
(-3.05)  (2.06)  (2.23)  (1.02)
MBR  Yes  _O.O 0 a  1.02  0. 0 2b  3.59a  0.31  4.80
(-3.65)  (1.48)  (2.31)  (3.51)
ROE  Yes  0.02  0.82  3.91  0.10  2.05
(1.35)  (0.17)  (0.63)
ROE  Yes  0.02  1.71  19.7b  0.24  4.05
(1.25)  (0.34)  (2.24)
ROA  Yes  0.00  °  0 °  lIa  0.02  0.20  3.35
(1.40)  (-3.53)  (0.54)
ROA  Yes  0.00  °  0 Oa  0 0ob  0.24  4.60
(1.30)  (-3.19)  (2.18)
*t-statistics are in parentheses.
**Most industry dummies are significant at the 1% level, but not reported here.
35Table 3.3.2. Ownership Concentration and Firms' Performance
for the State- and Legal Person-Dominated Subsamples (SZSE 1995)*
DUM**  SALE  DAR  GROW  AlO  HERF  FST  Adj. R 2 F-Stat.
State-dominated (No. of Firms=67)
MBR  Yes  -o 0 36a  0 .72c  0 .30b  9 OOa  0.30  4.52
(-3.60)  (1.79)  (2.41)  (3.67)
MBR  Yes  0 . 2 9b  0.47  0.30b  1.45c  0.21  3.24
(-2.52)  (0.90)  (2.27)  (1.82)
MBR  Yes  0. 30b  0.51  0.30b  1. 28c  0.20  3.07
(-2.49)  (L.00)  (2.22)  (1.89)
ROE  Yes  0. 1 Oa  -0 17a  0.04  0.21  3.54
(2.91)  (-2.80)  (0.49)
ROE  Yes  0. 1 0a  -0.18  0.13  0.24  3.91
(2.68)  (-2.81)  (1.16)
Legal Person-dominated (No. ofCFirms=60)
DUM**  SALE  DAR  GROW  AIO  HERF  FLP  Adj. R 2 F-Stat.
MBR  Yes  -0.28b  0.94a  0.38a  1.98a  0.50  8.50
(-2.56)  (2.97)  (3.66)  (5.03)
MBR  Yes  -0.29b  0.83b  0.38a  171a  0.38  5.60
(-2.38)  (2.31)  (3.66)  (3.35)
MBR  Yes  -0.23  0.81b  0 .44a  0.89 c  0.31  4.80
(-1.57)  (2.23)  (4.36)  (1.85)
ROE  Yes  0.08a  -0.04  0 15b  0.28  4.30
(5.79)  (-0.62)  (2.49)
ROE  Yes  0.08a  -0.05  0.27a  0.35  5.61
(5.84)  (-0.84)  (3.27)
ROA  Yes  0.03a  -0.07b  0 .08b  0.12  2.24
(4.16)  (-2.37)  (2.39)
ROA  Yes  08 03a  -0 08a  0 14a  0.22  3.33
(4.04)  (-2.77)  (3.21)
*t-statistics are in parentheses.
**Most industry dummies are significant at the 1% level, but not reported here.
36Table 3.4.1. Pooled Regressions:
Ownership Mix and Firms' Performance, Shanghai and Shenzhen, 1993-95
Const.  Ind.  D93  D94  SZ  SALE  DAR  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R 2
Dependent  variable=Market  to Book Value Ratio  ( N=673)
MBR  2.89  No  2.A5a  0.56a  -1.27'  -0.22  0.23  50.56
(27.7)  (17.98)  (4.77)  (-12.74)  (-1.07)
MBR  2.57  No  2.16  '  0.54  '  -1.27  a  0.86'  0.25  56.39
(24.92)  (18.24)  (4.70)  (-12.71)  (3.89)
MBR  3.36  No  2.059  0.53a  H-116a  -1.87'  0.27  63.19
(22.62)  (16.71)  (4.72)  (-12.45)  (-5.65)
MBR  No  Yes  2.25  a  0.60  '  -1.46'  -0.00  '  1.00  '  -0.13  0.31  30.88
(17.58)  (5.58)  (-13.89)  (-5.48)  (3.07)  (-0.62)
MBR  No  Yes  2.27  '  0.59  '  -1.47  '  -0.00  I  .11a  0.72'  0.32  32.87
(18.26)  (5.57)  (-13.77)  (-5.37)  (3.51)  (3.32)
MBR  No  Yes  2.12'  0.56'  -1.32a  -0.00a  0.94a  -2.30'  0.37  39.95
(16.65)  (5.48)  (-13.77)  (-5.96)  (3.07)  (-6.82)
Dependent  variable=Retum  to Equity  (N=668)
ROE  No  Yes  0.06 '  0.03  -0.003  0.00  a  0.01  -0.03  0.16  13.42
(6.75)  (5.36)  (-0.50)  (3.81)  (0.87)  (-2.73)
ROE  No  Yes  0.06'  0.03'  -0.001  0.00'  0.01  0.03'  0.16  13.28
(6.63)  (5.22)  (-0.23)  (3.80)  (0.73)  (2.63)
ROE  No  Yes  0.06'  0.03a  -0.001  0.00'  0.01  0.002  0.14  12.25
(6.47)  (5.21)  (-0.14)  (3.63)  (0.35)  (0.18)
Dependent  variable=Return  to Asset  (N=668)
ROA  No  Yes  0.03  '  0.02'  -0.002  0.00  '  -0.1  1  -0.02'  0.32  32.55
(6.26)  (5.16)  (-0.54)  (3.99)  (-12.91)  (-2.71)
ROA  No  Yes  0.04 '  0.02'  -0.001  0.00 '  -0.11  '  0.02'  0.32  33.09
(6.21)  (5.03)  (-0.32)  (4.02)  (-13.11)  (3.17)
ROA  No  Yes  0.03'  0.02  '  -0.00  0.00'  -0.12  '  -0.01  0.31  31.28
(5.99)  (4.98)  (-0.07)  (3.69)  (-13.62)  (-0.90)
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent  t statistics  are in  the parentheses.  Five industrial  dummies  are included
in most regressions  and their coefficients  are all positive  and significant  at 1%  level.
a,b, c: indicate  significant  at 1%, 5%, and 10%  level,  respectively.
37Table 3.4.2. Pooled Regressions:
Ownership Concentration and Mix and Firms' Performance
Shanghai and Shenzhen, 1995
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  GROW  A5  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R 2
Dependent  variable=Market  to Book  Value Ratio  ( N=311)
MBR  Yes  -1.47  -0.00  1.18  0.00  2.24  -0.34  0.36  18.11
(-10.89)  (-4.52)  (3.60)  (2.80)  (4.47)  (-1.27)
MBR  Yes  -1.45  -0.00  1.18  0.00  1.97  0.45  0.36  18.41
(-10.80)  (-4.49)  (3.65)  (2.86)  (4.29)  (1.79)
MBR  Yes  -1.32  -0.00  1.07  0.00  0.86  -1.61  0.37  19.80
(-10.29)  (-5.0)  (3.41)  (2.37)  (1.57)  (-3.54)
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  GROW  AIO  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R2
MBR  Yes  -1.30  -0.00  1.12  0.00  2.18  -0.31  0.35  17.84
(-10.39)  (-4.49)  (3.34)  (2.72)  (4.40)  (-1.16)
MBR  Yes  -1.29  -0.00  1.13  0.00  1.93  0.44  0.36  18.15
(-10.35)  (-4.46)  (3.50)  (2.79)  (4.30)  (1.76)
MBR  Yes  -1.25  -0.00  1.05  0.00  0.72  -1.68  0.38  19.64
(-10.33)  (-5.01)  (3.33)  (2.32)  (1.28)  (-3.47)
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  GROW  HERF  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R 2
MBR  Yes  -1.31  -0.00  1.09  0.00  1.82  -0.53  0.32  15.87
(-  10.10)  (-4.69)  (3.31)  (2.28)  (2.40)  (-1.36)
MBR  Yes  -1.30  -0.00  1.10  0.00  1.62  0.79  0.34  17.01
(-10.04)  (-4.62)  (3.40)  (2.49)  (2.86)  (2.73)
MBR  Yes  -1.25  -0.00  1.04  0.00  0.36  -1.97  0.37  19.45
(-10.27)  (-5.01)  (3.23)  (2.18)  (0.71)  (-5.06)
To be continued  on the next page.
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent  t statistics  are in the parentheses. Five industrial  dummies  are included
in most regressions  and their coefficients  are all positive  and significant  at I% level.
38Table 3.4.2 continued
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  A5  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R-
Dependent variable=Return to Equity (N=300)
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.02  0.04  -0.05  0.09  4.38
(-2.60)  (2.75)  (0.71)  (1.53)  (-2.56)
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.08  3.97
(-1.87)  (2.76)  (0.65)  (1.42)  (1.75)
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.07  3.45
(-2.13)  (2.77)  (0.26)  (1.05)  (0.91)
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  AIO  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R2
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.02  0.04  -0.05  0.09  4.43
(-2.17)  (2.76)  (0.67)  (1.65)  (-2.59)
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.08  3.84
(-1.95)  (2.79)  (0.44)  (0.51)  (1.83)
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.07  3.52
(-1.86)  (2.78)  (0.21)  (1.29)  (1.10)
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  HERF  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R2
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  0.07  -0.06  0.10  4.83
(-2.03)  (2.73)  (0.60)  2.50)  (-3.25)
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.08  3.91
(-1.86)  (2.77)  (0.37)  (0.96)  (2.06)
ROE  Yes  -0.02  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.07  3.39
(-1.86)  (2.77)  (0.20)  (0.59)  (0.56)
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  A5  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R
Dependent variable=Return to Asset (N=300)
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.08  0.02  -0.02  0.22  10.11
(-2.62)  (2.98)  (-6.03)  (1.84)  (-2.65)
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.01  0.02  0.21  9.68
(-2.23)  (3.08)  (-6.30)  (0.67)  (2.07)
ROA  Yes  0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.02  0.01  0.20  9.05
(-2.21)  (3.02)  (-6.46)  (I.10)  (0.57)
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  AIO  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R2
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.08  0.03  -0.02  0.22  10.18
(-2.21)  (2.99)  (-6.11)  (1.94)  (-2.70)
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.01  0.02  0.21  9.71
(-2.06)  (3.07)  (-6.35)  (0.83)  (2.05)
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.02  0.01  0.20  9.13
(-1.94)  (3.05)  (-6.54)  (1.35)  (0.81)
Ind.  SZ  SALE  DAR  HERF  FST  FLP  FTA  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R 2
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.08  0.04  -0.03  0.22  10.73
(-2.07)  (2.96)  (-6.19)  (2.88)  (-3.32)
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.02  0.02  0.21  9.89
(-1.92)  (3.03)  (-6.39)  (1.52)  (2.37)
ROA  Yes  -0.01  0.00  -0.09  0.01  0.02  0.19  9.00
(-1.90)  (3.02)  (-6.54)  0.83  (0.20)
39Table 3.5  Pooled regressions:
Ownership Structure and Firms' Performance:
Nonlinear Specifications for FLP
Ind.  D93  D94  SZ  SALE  DAR  FLP2  FLP  Adj.  F
DUM  DUM.  R 2
MBR  Yes  2.25  0.56  -1.34  -0.00  0.99  4.29  -2.46  0.35  33.18
(17.94)  (5.44)  (-12.44)  (-5.58)  (3.20)  (3.75)  (-3.21)
ROE  Yes  0.06  0.03  -0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.16  13.36
(6.63)  (5.18)  (-0.04)  (3.79)  (0.65)  (2.77)
ROA  Yes  0.03  0.02  -0.00  0.00  -0.11  0.03  0.33  33.44
(6.23)  (4.99)  (-0.07)  (4.01)  (-13.24)  (3.45)
Note: Including  both  Shanghai  and Shenzhen  samples, 1993-95. Number  of observation=673.
Table 3.6. Ownership Structure and Labor productivity
Dependent variable: log(Y 1/Li)
A  A
a,  *  2  a3 4  15  01  02  03  04  05  R2
1993
FST  -2.55  -2.93  -2.00  -2.31  -2.36  0.94  0.72  0.99  1.13  0.94  o 037b  0.91
(-17)  (-10)  (-20)  (-Il)  (-26)  (I1)  (4.3)  (39)  (9.3)  (27)  (-2.1)
FLP  -2.78  -3.14  -2.27  -2.53  -2.53  0.95  0.72  0.97  1.11  0.97  0.34b  0.91
(-18)  (-10)  (-25)  (-I 1)  (-26)  (I 1)  (4.0)  (47)  (8.9)  (36)  (2.0)
1994
FST  -2.64  -2.71  -2.28  -2.17  -2.78  1.06  0.97  1.02  0.97  1.07  -0.61b  0.82
(-21)  (-  1)  (-43)  (-8.1)  (-14)  (9.9)  (3.5)  (37)  (7.6)  (7.2)  (-2.2)
FLP  -2.92  -2.93  -2.65  -2.37  -3.04  1.11  1.04  1.00  0.90  1.13  0.42b  0.82
(-22)  (-8.9)  (-21)  (-8.2)  (-15)  (10)  (3.5)  (37)  (7.2)  (6.8)  (2.1)
a, b, and c: Significant  at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  level.
40Table  3.7. Ownership  Structure  and Debt/Asset  Ratio
Dependent Variable: DAR
DI*  D2  D3  D4  D5 FST  FLP  R 2
1993
SHSE  0.33  0.24  0.10  0.41  0.30  0.22a  0.28
(11.1)  (7.76)  (2.63)  (8.49)  (5.44)  (4.28)
0.47  0.36  0.24  0.56  0.39  -0.16a  0.22
(18.5)  (9.75)  (5.57)  (9.77)  6.73)  (-2.81)
SZSE  0.38  0.35  0.36  0.48  0.39  0.05  0.00
(9.52)  (4.98)  (2.65)  (6.67)  (5.18)  (0.56)
0.44  0.43  0.42  0.55  0.45  .0.15C  0.00
(14.0)  (5.15)  (3.05)  (8.45)  (5.96)  (-1.68)
1994
SHSE  0.33  0.26  0.19  0.47  0.43  0.218  0.20
(14.0)  (9.41)  (4.74)  (8.05)  (12.5)  (4.41)
0.42  0.36  0.30  0.57  0.51  0 .Iob  0.12
(21.8)  (11.6)  - (7.31)  (8.85)  (10.1)  (-2.16)
SZSE  0.39  0.44  0.44  0.52  0.46  0.08  0.02
(12.4)  (7.77)  (4.74)  (11.7)  (7.20)  (1.18)
0.45  0.51  0.51  0.58  0.51  -0.12C  0.04
(15.3)  (7.93)  (4.85)  (11.8)  (8.60)  (-1.74)
a, b, and c: Significant at the  1%, 5%, and  10% level.
*DI through  D5 are the five industry  dummies.
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A.1.  The Anglo-American  Model vs tile German-Japanese  Model
Many  recent  studies  have compared  two different  models  in corporate  governance,  the Anglo-
American  model  versus  the German-Japanese  model  (e.g. Prowse 1994,  Aoki and Kim, 1995). Corporate
governance  refers  to the institutions  and mechanisms  in which  suppliers  of finance to corporations
(owners)  control  managers  to ensure  returns  on their investment. These institutions  and mechanisms  are
much different  in the economies  of continental  Europe  and Japan,  as compared  to the systems  of United
Kingdom  and the United  States.
Some  authors  have made an interesting  classification  to distinguish  the above mentioned  models
as "control-oriented'  and "arm's-length"  financing. In "control-oriented"  financing,  corporations  have
core investors  who own significant  stakes  or shares, management  will be under more  scrutiny  by the core
investors,  be it a bank, a nonbank  financial  institution,  or other  corporations. Concentration  of ownership
provides  the investors  with both  the incentive  and the ability to monitor  and control  the management.  The
three largest  banks in Germany  own a large  share  of the stocks  of publicly  traded  corporations.  They also
vote on behalf  of individual  shareholders. In Japan,  there is a higher  degree  of corporate  cross  share-
holding,  and banks  are among  the largest  shareholders  of publicly  listed  corporations.  (See  Table A.  1.  1)
In the "arm's-length"  financing,  share  ownership  is widely  dispersed,  and shareholder  influence
on management  is weak. Unsatisfactory  performance  is often  sanctioned  by shareholders  selling
shares("voting  by feet")  and by subsequent  hostile  takeovers. In the United  States,  government
regulations  prohibit  banks, mutual funds,  pension  funds  and insurance  companies  to take controlling  stakes
in the corporations  for the purpose  of ensuring  asset diversification.  Shareholders'  interests,  in  this model,
is protected  largely  by a liquid  equity  market,  by regulations  on information  disclosure,  on insider-trading
and minority  shareholder  rights.
Table  A.  1.1  shows  some aggregate  statistics  on the ownership  structure  of listed  companies  in the
U.S.,  Japan and Germany. It reveals  a much higher  degree of institutional  cross  share-holding  in Japan  (73
percent),  and heavier  bank involvement  (19  percent)  in corporate  governance,  as compared  to the United
States. Germany  seems  to lie in between  Japan  and the United  States in terms of both  corporate  cross
share-holding  (64 percent)  and bank ownership  of equity  (10 percent). However,  German  banks  have  more
power  to exercise  the voting rights since  they can vote on behalf  of individual  shareholders  whose  shares
are held in trust.
Table  A.  1.2  shows  the ownership  concentration  in a sample of large,  listed U.S.  Japanese  and
German nonfinancial  firms. A column  on China is added for a rough  comparison. The table shows  that
first,  ownership  concentration  varies widely  across  countries. In the United  States,  the largest  five
shareholders  hold  on average  about 25 percent  of the outstanding  share of the corporation. Ownership
concentration  is higher in Japan where  the five largest  shareholders  hold  about 33 percent  of the
outstanding  shares. The concentration  ratio is the highest  in Germany  (42 percent)  where  the voting  power
is more  concentrated  than the data suggested  due to the above mentioned  voting rights  by the banks. Proxy
votes exercised  by the banks  on behalf  of shareholders  are very important  in the large  German
corporations. 32 Moreover,  many large German  firms  have  a pyramid  holding  company  structure,  where
ownership  is concentrated  in successive  layers  of holding  companies,  many of which  are ultimately
31 This part is for the purpose  of cross-country  comparison  as explicitly  required  by the RAD  and
Research  Committee.  It is also useful for Chinese  audience.
32 For example,  of the 100  largest  joint stock companies  (AGs) in Germany  in 1978,  banks  had a
combined  voting  power  (from their direct holdings  and proxies)  of greater  than  25% in 41 of them. In the
56 AGs in which  banks  had a combined  voting  power  of greater  than 5%, their average  share of the vote
was almost 57%. (Dittus  and Prowse 1996,  p.24)
42controlled  by either  a wealthy  family  or a bank (Dittus  and Prowse 1996,  and Baums  and Randow  1995).
In continental  European  countries,  a majority  stake in listed  joint stock  corporations  is a fairly  common
feature. A single large  owner  who holds  more  than 50 percent  of a corporation's  stock is present  in over
50 percent  of domestic  stocks  quoted in Germany,  France  and Italy,  compared  to only about 5 percent in
the United  States  and the United  Kingdom  (OECD  1995  and Prowse 1994).
Corporate  control mechanisms  are remarkably  different  in the Anglo-American  and German-
Japanese  models. In general,  a number  of mechanisms  can be used to prevent  the firm from deviating  too
far from value-maximizing  behavior,  including  direct  and indirect  monitor  and control  measures.  Stiglitz
(1985) emphasized that the most important  of these  mechanisms involves the concentration with which the
financial  claims  of thefirm are held  If the equity  is concentrated  in  the hands  of a few investors,  each
investor  will have  sufficient  incentive  to invest  in information  acquisition  and monitoring  of management.
In addition,  their large  shareholdings  also give them the ability  to control  over  management. If
concentration  of ownership  is an impossibility,  indirect  monitor  and control  measures  must be used, which
include  an active  takeover  market,  a well-functioning,  competitive  market  for managers,  and a
concentration  of lenders.
Table A.  1.3  and A. 1.4  show the different  corporate  mechanisms  in the two models. In the Anglo-
American  model, indirect  corporate  control  measures  are often  used, including  hostile  takeovers  and
leveraged  buyouts,  "voting  by feet",  proxy  contests,  performance-based  incentive  contracts,  and legal
protections  of minority  shareholder  rights. Whereas,  in the German-Japanese  model, direct  control is
preferred  including,  control  of the board,  appointment  and/or  replacement  of chief officers,  and monitoring
by large  stakeholders  (be it financial  institutions,  nonfinancial  institutions,  or individuals). Hostile
takeovers  are virtually  non-existent  in Japan  and Germany.  (Table  A.  1.4). Since  the World  War 11,  for
example,  there have  only been four successful  hostile  takeovers  in  Germnany  (Franks  and Mayer 1993).  The
use of takeovers  for replacing  inefficient  management  in Japan is very infrequent. In the United  States,
however,  almost 10  percent of Fortune  500 firms in 1980  have since  been  acquired in a hostile  transaction
(Prowse 1994).
What  are the determinants  of these  differences  in ownership  concentration  and corporate  control
mechanisms? We turn to this question  in section  A.3.
A.2  Increased Ownershtip Concentration  Over Time
Ownership  concentration  has been  increasing  over  time in all OECD  countries. There  has been  a
marked  shift from shareholding  by individuals  to shareholding  by the financial  sector, i.e. banks,  securities
firms  and institutional  investors  (mutual  funds, insurance  companies,  and pension  funds)  since  the 1960s
(OECD 1995). In Britain,  the financial  sector  now holds over  60 percent of all equity. 3 3 The proportion
of shareholding  by private  households,  which  has declined  to about 50 percent in the United  States,  ranges
between 16  and 24 percent in other  large OECr) countries  (Table  A.2.  1).  In the United  States,  and United
Kingdom,  pension  funds and mutual  funds  have gained  the most from the shift  away from households.
Whereas,  in  Germany  and Japan,  banks and insurance  companies  have  enlarged  their role as shareholders.
It is noteworthy  that the nonfinancial  enterprises  sector  is a major  holder  in most major  OECD  countries,
except  for the United  States and United  Kingdom. In particular,  French  non-financial  enterprises  now hold
the major  part of all equity  outstanding  in France  (59 percent),  due mainly  to the privatization  of public
enterprises. In Italy and Sweden,  nonfinancial  enterprises  hold  32 to 34 percent  of all outstanding  shares
respectively  (OECD  1995,  p. 16-17).
In Germany,  the ownership  and control  rights  of corporations  have  been increasingly  concentrated
in the hands  of financial  and nonfinancial  institutions  over time  (Table  A.2.2). In  other words,  the
33 However,  majority  of the shareholding  by financial  sector is held in  the trust accounts. Shareholding
under the banks' own accounts  is minimal  in Britain,  compared  to those in  Japan and Germany.
43institutional  cross-shareholding  has becoming  more significant. From 1984  to 1993,  the proportion  of
outstanding  shares  owned  by all financial  and nonfinancial  corporations  increased  from 50 percent  to 68
percent, in  which  the proportion  held by banks rose from 7.6 percent  to 14  percent. Whereas,  the
proportion  of outstanding  shares  held by individuals,  government  and foreign  investors  have  decreased  in
the same  period.  In Japan,  the proportion  of equity  shares  owned by banks  increased  from around  8
percent in the 1960s  to 18  percent in 1990  and 22 percent  in 1993.  The proportion  of shares  owned  by
individuals  declined  from 46 percent  in the 1960s  to 24 percent  in 1993  (Miyajima 1995,  p.380,  and OECD
1995)
In addition  to increased  ownership  concentration,  there has also  been a trend  of an increased
shareholder  activism  since  the 1980s  and 1990s.  Institutions,  whether its financial  institutions  or
nonfinancial  corporations,  are playing  more important  roles in the monitoring  and control of management.
Even  in the United  States,  where  the "arm's length  financing"  is most rigorously  pursued,  institutional
investors  have become  more  active in exercising  control. Two examples  include  the State of Wisconsin
Investment  Board  and the California  Public Em'ployees  Retirement  system  (Calpers). 34
The increased  concentration  of ownership  in the hands  of financial  and nonfinancial  institutions
does not happen  by accident. What  are the driving  forces  behind  the trend?  EiMLand  foremost,  the
benefits  of concentrated  ownership  are theoretically  clear: it provides  the investors  with both  sufficient
private  incentive,  as well as the power  to monitor  and control  management,  and to achieve  profit
maximization  (Shleifer  and Vishny  1996). Thus,  concentration  may in  general be the most efficient  way
of resolving  agency  problems  in firms--  a view expressed  in Prowse 1994  (p.9).  Secn,  the economy  of
scale and the economy  of scope  are evident for banks  and financial  institutions  to engage  in corporate
monitor  and control.  Informnation  collected  when  making  loans  can well be used to evaluate  managerial
performance.  Third,  the rapid growth  of institution  investors  and deregulation  have contributed  to the rise
of investor  activism. Until 1992,  SEC severely  restricted  investors  ability  to cooperate  with  one another.
Since  the scrapping  of these  restrictions,  fund managers  have  the desire,  the mandate,  as well  as the means
to exercising  active  monitor  and control.  And hence, investor  activism  has become  a trend, thanks  to
deregulation.
Looking  into  the future,  rather than market-based  or bank-based  systems,  we might  see that a
broader  and institution-centered  ownership andgovernance  structure  will appear in the horizon. What
might  be the causes  for ownership  concentration  in the hands  of institutions?  See next section.
A.3  Thte  Needs and Causesfor  Ownership Concentration
What  is the legal,  regulatory  and institutional  underpinning  for Anglo-American  model  and
German-Japanese  models?  What  determines  the ownership  structure  and corporate  governance  in a
particular  country?  Why is there a need for ownership  concentration  in various countries  including
transition  economies? We try to assess  these questions  in this section.
Prowse  (1994)  argued  that differences  in the two  models  are a result of striking  differences  in the
firm's legal and regulatorX  environment  which  affects  the degree  to which  the concentration  holding  of the
firm's financial  claims  is achieved. Regulatory  restrictions  on investors'  (particularly  financial
institutions')  holding  o large  debt and equity  stakes  in individual  firms in the Anglo-American  countries
has led to relatively  dispersed  holdings. Table  A.3.1 documented  the legal and regulatory  constraints  on
corporate  control. The U.S.  and U.K. laws  are in general  much more  hostile  to investors  taking  large,
34 It is reported  that  institutional  investors  have  been able to alert fellow  shareholders  to troublesome
issues  and gang up against  recalcitrant  managers. The State  of Wisconsin  Investment  Board  was able to
arrange  cooperation  with  other shareholders  and removed  Joseph  Antonini,  the chief  executive  of Kmart;
and of much of the board  of WR  Grace,  a chemicals  company. The California  Public  employees
Retirement  System  (Calpers)  is using  a similar  approach  to force  changes  at Oryx Energy  and Boise
Cascade,  a paper company. (Source:  The Economist,  April  29, 1995)
44influential  stakes in firms. Whereas,  financial  institutions  in  Japan  and Germany  are generally  given much
more latitude  to own shares  and exert  control over large firms.
In the U.S.,  for example,  banks  are simply  prohibited  from owning  any stock on their own account
by the Glass-Steagall  Act of 1933  (which  has been recently  phased  out, see a footnote  in section  5.2).
Bank holding  companies  cannot  own more  than 5% of any one firm and their holdings  must be passive.
Other financial  institutions  such as insurance  companies  also face strict rules goveming  their equity
investment. There  are also impediments  to non-financial  firms taking  large  stakes in firms. U.S.  antitrust
laws have  been hostile  to the inter-corporate  ties that would  be implied  by large  inter-corporate
shareholdings. For instance,  Du Pont held a 25% stake  in General  Motors,  until forced  by a Supreme
Court ruling  in the late 1950s  to sever all ties with  GM.  The U.S. security  laws  in general discourage
concentrated  active  shareholding  by any one investor. In the United  Kingdom,  there are fewer formal
restrictions  on concentrated  shareholdings  in firms,  but those that exist  still appear  substantial. Banks'
links with  nonfinancial  firms have been  subject to strict prudential  rules. Exposure  in excess  of 10%  of a
bank's capital  must be approved  by the Bank of England. Pension  funds and insurance  companies  have
self-imposed  limits  on shareholding,  and do not invest  more than  2-5% of their assets  in any one company.
Mutual  funds have similar  rules.
In Japan, however,  financial  institutions  are subject  to few  regulations  regarding  shareholdings.
Japanese  commercial  banks  are not prohibited  from owning  corporate  stock,  except  that they are subject  to
anti-monopoly  regulations which  intil  1987  limited  a single  bank's holdings  of a single  firm's shares  to
10% (the limit  has since  been lowered  to 5%). On paper,  Japanese  antitrust  laws  and insider  trading
regulations  look  similar  to those in the United  States. It is however  widely  recognized  that they are not
enforced  by the government.  In Germany,  relationship  between  banks  and industry  is not burdened  at all
by regulations. German  financial  system  is based  on the principle  of universal  banking. Universal  banks
can hold whatever  share of equity  they like in  any non-financial  firm. Antitrust  laws have not been used to
discourage  inter-corporate  shareholdings  as they have in the U.S.  There is no explicit  legislation  against
insider  trading. (Prowse  1994,  p.2 1)
Other  authors  have pointed  to legal and institutional  factors  that determine  the degree  of
concentration  and corporate  control mechanisms  in a particular  country. Shleifer  and Vishny 1995
analyzes  the cost and benefit  of ownership  concentration,  and argue that  weak legal  protection  of minority
shareholders'  interests  in continental  European  countries  may explain  why ownership  is more  concentrated
there.  They  conclude  that,
"The  principal  advantage  of concentrated  ownership  is that it relies  on relatively  simple  judicial
interventions,  which  are suitable for even poorly  informed  and motivated  courts. Concentrated
ownership  puts a much smaller burden  on the legal  enforcement  system  than does the protection
of minority  investors  or the adjudication  of multiple  creditor  disputes. For this reason,  perhaps,
concentrated  ownership  is so prevalent  in most countries  in  the world,  where courts  are much
less  equipped  to meddle in corporate  affairs  than they are, for example,  in the United  States.
(p.32)"
Demsetz  and Lyhn  (1984) view ownership  concentration  as a consequence  of volatile  economic
environment  in which firms  operates. One example is that Japanese  banks  have equity  holdings  in firns to
which  they make  loans,  which  could be considered  as additional  insurance  for loan  repayment  in a volatile
environment. Gorton  and Schmid  (1996) consider  the less  developed  stock market  and noisy stock prices
as causes  of ownership  concentration  in the hands  of financial  institutions.  Universal  banking in Germany
has been an alternative  mechanism  to stock market  for corporate  governance  because  stock market  has
historically  been small  and less developed.
Some implications  can be derived  for the transition  economies,  based  on the above surveys  of
analysis on the determinants  of ownership  and governance  mechanisms. Why is there a need for
ownership  concentration,  especially  in the transition  economies? These economies  usually  have
45*  a weak and less  sophisticated  legal  system  and enforcement  mechanism,  where  courts  are less
equipped  to meddle  with corporate  affairs,  and the interests  of minority  shareholders  might  not be well
protected.
*  a weak and less  developed  regulatory  system. Regulations  on antitrust,  on insider  trading,  on nonbank
financial  institutions  may not be in place,  or may not be rigorously  enforced.
*  a less developed  equity  market  and noisy  stock prices.  The market  capitalization  of the emerging
equity  market  is usually  is small and trading  is noisy  --there are many speculators  and few long  term
investors. The information  content  of the stock prices is limited.  Equity  markets  in  these countries
are usually  illiquid,  making  hostile  takeovers  almost  impossible.
*  a more  volatile  economic  environment  and imperfect  product/factor  markets. The market  systems  are
newly established  and may not function  very  well. The indirect  measures  of monitor  and control,  such
as the market  for managers, and the bankruptcy  mechanism  in the product  market  (not to mention
takeover  market),  may not be functioning.  Thus,  direct measures  of monitor  and control,  such  as
majority  ownership  and control  of the board,  are much needed.
We now  turn to the experience  of Czech  Republic  and Russia  to see whether or not concentrated
ownership  indeed  results  in better corporate  performnance.
A.4.  The Experience  of East European  Transition Economies
After  an extensive  literatu_re  survey on East  European  transition  economies,  only three  papers  are
found to have closely  related  and comparable  statistical  analysis  with  the present  one. Claessens  (1996)
and Claessens,  Djankov  and Pohl (1996) investigate  the ownership  and corporate  governance  in Czech
Republic,  Blasi  and Shleifer  (1996) looks  at the same issue in Russia  using  enterprise  survey data. We
draw heavily from  these papers  for the purpose  of comparison  in this section.
In the Czech  Republic,  it is found  that  the more concentrated  ownership  is, the higher  the market
valuation  of a firm and the higher its profitability,  for a cross-section  of 706 firms over  the 1991-95  period
(Claessens  et al 1996).  Tobin's Q was used for firm valuation,  which  is the ratio of the market  value  to the
accounting  (i.e., replacement)  value  of the firm. It is measured  as the market  value of equity  plus  the face
value  of debt relative  to the book value of net fixed  assets  and inventory. After controlling  for some firm
specific-variables,  it is found  that several  measures  of ownership  concentration  are positively  related  to
Tobin's  Q and profitability. Tobin's Qs and profitability  are also higher  when bank-sponsored  funds  have
large  ownership.
Table A.4.1,  Panel A, shows  the summary  statistics  on the ownership  structure  of the firms in the
Czech  Republic. Six investor  classes  are distinguished:  the state (by the National  Property  Fund),
individuals,  bank  and non-bank  sponsored  investment  privatization  funds, domestic  direct  and foreign
direct investors. Several  banks have  sponsored  more  than one investment  fund making  it possible  to
exceed  the 20% individual  fund ownership  threshold. Altogether,  263 non-bank  sponsored  funds were
listed  at least  once as owners  in their data.  The concentration  among investment  funds is quite high. The
top five investment  funds,  for example,  owned  on average 48.8 % (40.7  %) of a first (second)  wave  firm at
the end of 1995,  only slightly  less  than the average  fraction  owned by all funds  combined,  with  bank-
sponsored  funds owning  21.2 % (9.8 %) and non-bank  sponsored  funds 27.6 % (30.9%).
Ownership  concentration  significantly  increased  for the average  firm  over time. The authors  used
two measures  for  the degree of ownership  concentration:  the share of equity  held by the five most
important  investors  combined,  A5, and the Herfindahl  index  (the sum of squared  ownership  shares),  H.
Table A.3.  1, Panel  B, shows  that  ownership  concentration  increased  by both  measures:  shares  held by the
top 5 investors  (excluding  the state) rose from 47.2 percent  in 1991  to 59.4 percent  in 1995.  And
Herfindahl  index increased  from 0.076 in 1991  to 0.134 in 1995.
Table A.4.  1, Panel  C reports  summary  statistics  for firm performance  indicators.  There is a
decline  in the average  Tobin's Q over  the years as the aggregate  stock market  went down after the initial
46surge in 1992.  Profitability is defined as gross (operating) profit over net fixed assets plus inventory.  It
increases over time, varying between  12 % in 1992 and  17% in 1995 on average. The correlation between
Tobin's Q and profitability goes up over time, which suggests that the market valuation becomes a better
indicator of relative profitability as accounting data start to reflect the changes in the firms' performance.
The regression results for the concentration variable is that the lower the dispersion of ownership
(the higher H), the higher Tobin's Q and profitability (Table A.4.2, regression i). Ownership by the top
five investors,  A5, has similarly a significantly positive influence on Tobin's Q and profitability (not
reported).  These results are quite strong and show that more concentrated ownership has a positive
association with firm value and profitability.
The authors then investigate the role of different type of shareholders through running regressions
where they include the equity share for bank sponsored investment fund, non-bank sponsored investment
fund, state, local and foreign strategic investors. The coefficients for H is no longer significant for either
the Tobin's Q or the profitability regression in regression ii.  It indicates that there is value to having large
blockholder ownership, since the coefficient for state ownership is significantly positive for the Q
regression and the coefficients are positive for local strategic ownership (significant) and foreign strategic
ownership (marginally significant) for the profitability regression.  The coefficient for non-bank sponsored
investment fund ownership is positive, but not significant.  Most importantly, the coefficient for bank-
sponsored investment fund ownership is positive and significant for the Tobin's Q regression.
The authors then conclude that,
"the Czech voucher scheme led to relatively concentrated ownership.  Of the shares offered
through the voucher scheme, two-thirds ended up with investment funds and one-third with
private individuals.  Analysis of market valuation and profitability provides strong evidence that
more concentrated ownership is associated with higher valuation and profitability.  Ownership
by bank-sponsored funds is associated with even higher valuation and profitability and thus
appears to be especially useful to change the way firms are managed.  Firms with state owners
and local and foreign strategic owners also do have higher valuation and profitability,
suggesting that ownership by these investors entails some benefits too  (Claessens et al 1996,
P. II)."
Results from regression analysis in this present paper, though used a slightly different method and
data from China, are largely consistent with those of Claessens et al 1996.
Blasi and Shleifer (1996) investigates corporate governance in Russia using a survey of 170
enterprises conducted between  1992 and 1993, and two surveys of smaller samples of enterprises
conducted in 1994.  It is found that immediately after the mass privatization program, all insiders owned
on average 65 percent of equity shares in privatized enterprises in December 1993, in which top
management held about 9 percent.  Among the  142 enterprises, 91 percent were majority employee owned,
and 9 percent minority employee owned.  Insider control of firms is a fairly common feature of Russian
privatization.
Comparing ownership structure in privatized enterprises in 1993 and  1994, the authors found that,
first, average outsider ownership has increased from 21.5 percent to 29 percent, but the average sized of
blockholder stakes has gone down.  And second, the main outsiders, including voucher investment funds,
individual citizens, and commercial firms, have a small average ownership share (4-5 percent) across all
companies.  Other shareholders such as banks, insurance companies and foreign firms are playing a minor
role in the overall structure of outside ownership.
The paper could not investigate the linkage between ownership structure and performance due to
data limitations.  There is some weak evidence that restructuring has occurred to some extent in privatized
enterprises since employment has been declining since 1991 but the declines have slowed over time.  There
47is, however,  no linkage  between  ownership  structure  and presence  or absence  of outsiders  on boards of
directors.
In conclusion,  Russian  privatization,  in sharp  contrast  with the Czech  case,  has been  dominated  by
insider-control  of firms,  and the role of outside  shareholders  is minimal  in  corporate  control.  There  is little
incentive  for insiders  to restructure  the firms and improve  the financial  performance. Thus,  the authors
argued  strongly  that "the creation  of blockholder  stakes  must be accelerated";  that  "management
manipulation  of the investor-company  relationship  must be addressed  directly...";  and that  "the 'worker
control' bogeyman  must be put to rest..."  (Blasi  and Shleifer,  1996,  p. 104)
48Table A.1.1 Ownership of Common Stock, 1990
(Percentage of outstanding shares owned)
Shareholders  United  Japan  Germany  Czech  China (listed
States  Rep.  companies,
1995  1995)
All corporations  44.5  72.9  64.0  45.5  28.7
Financial  institutions  30.4  48.0  22.0
Banks  0  18.9  10.0  15.5  '
Insurance  companies  4.6  19.6  -
Pension  funds  20.1  9.5  12.0
Other  5.7  - - 30 2
Nonfinancial  corporations  14.1  24.9  42.0
Individuals  50.2  22.4  17.0  49 3  31.5
Foreign  investors  5.4  4.0  14.0  3.4  6.1
Government  0  0.7  5.0  3.2  30.9
Source:  U.S. Federal  Reserve  Flow  of Funds,  Japanese  Flow  of Funds,  Deutsche  Bundesbank
Monthly Report.  Also in Dittus and Prowse  (1996). The column on Czech  Republic  is based on
Claessens  et al 1996. And the column  on China  is calculated  by the authors  based on
information  on listed companies  in 1995. The last  two columns  are not directly  comparable  with
the other three. N=:  1. Bank sponsored  investment  funds. 2. Nonbank  sponsored  investment
funds.  3. Include  both individuals  and local  strategic  investors.
Table A.1.2  Summary Statistics of Ownership Concentration of Large Nonfinancial
Corporations
(percentage of outstanding shares owned by the five largest shareholders)
United  Japan  Germany  Czech  China (listed
States  Rep.  companies,
1995  n=316) 1995
Mean (%)  25.4  33.1  41.5  57.8  58.1
Median  (%)  20.9  29.7  37.0  58.3
Standard  Deviation  16.0  13.8  14.5  17.5  15.8
Minimum  (%)  1.3  10.9  15.0  3.1
Maximum  (%)  87.1  85.0  89.6  94.4
Mean firm size: total assets
(millions of $, 1980)  3,505  1,835  3,483  162.4
Mean firm size: market value
of equity
(millions of $: 1980)  1,287  811  1,497  148.9
Source: Dittus  and Prowse 1996,  p.24. The  column on Czech Republic  is based on Claessens  et
al 1996,  Table 1. The column  on China is calculated  by the authors and is not directly
comparable  with the other  three columns. Note:  L.  These values  are in million  of 1995  dollars,
obtained by dividing  the current RMB  value by the exchange rate of $1=8.3  yuan.
49Table A.1.3.  Importance of different corporate control mechanisms in large non-
financial firms
Mechanism  United States  United Kingdom  Japan  Germany
Board independence/  Little  Little  Little formally.  Greatest
Power over  More influence
management  informally via
President's Club
meetings
Importance of  Small  Unknown,  Less  Important for
pay/performance  probably small  those firns  that
relationship in top  are owner-
management  managed.
compensation package
Monitoring by  Little  Little  Substantial  Some
financial institution
stakeholders
Monitoring by non-  Little  Little  Some  Substantial
financial firm
stakeholders
Monitoring by  Little  Little  Little  Important for
individual  those firms that
stakeholders  are owner-
managed.
Frequency of hostile  Frequent  Frequent  Virtually non-  Virtually non-
takeovers  existent  existent
Source:  Prowse 1994,  p. 52.
Table A.1.4.  Hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts as a percentage of all
attempted transactions, 1985-89
(percent)
United  States  United  Kingdom  Rest  of Europe
Hostile  takeovers  17.8  37.1  9.6
Leveraged  buyouts  20.0  5.9  2.7
Note: Hostile  offers  are defined  as those  transactions  in which  the acquiring  company  proceeds  with its
offer against  the wishes  of the target  company's  management. Data  include  both completed  and withdrawn
transactions.
Sources:  Securities  Data  Corporation,  Mergers  and Corporate  Transaction  Database.  Also in Prowse 1994,
p.49.
50Table A.2.1  Distribution of Outstanding Corporate Equity Among Different Types of Shareholders
(Percent  at year-end 1993)
Types  of Shareholders  United  Japan  Germnany  France  United  Italy  Sweden
States  Kingdom
All Corporations  46  69  68  67  64  51  58
Financial  Sector  46  45  29  8  62  19  24
Banks  22  14  3  1  ,10  I
Insurance  Companies  5  17  7  1  17  2  8
Pension/investment  funds  26  1  34  8
Mutual  funds  I1  3  8  2  7  6  6
Other  financial  inst.  4  1  2  3  1
Non-financial  enterprises  24  39  59  2  32  34
Individuals  49  24  17  19  18  17  16
Foreign  5  7  12  11  16  5  9
Public  Authorities  I  4  4  1  28  7
Other  2  10
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Source: OECD 1995,  p.17.
Table A.2.2  German  enterprises:  Ownership  structure  over  time,  1984-1993
(Percentage  of outstanding  shares  owned)
Types  of Shareholders  1984  1988  1990  1993
All corporations  49.5  53.4  64.0  68.0
Financial  institutions  13.4  14.3  22.0  29.0
Banks  7.6  8.1  10.0  14.0
Insurance  companies  3.1  2.7  - 7.0
Pension/investment  funds  2.7  3.5  12.0
Mutual  funds  8.0
Nonfinancial  corporations  36.1  39.1  42.0  39.0
Individuals  18.8  19.7  17.0  17.0
Foreign  investors  21.4  20.0  14.0  12.0
Government  10.2  7.0  5.0  4.0
Source: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Also in Edwards and Fischer 1994, p.180,
Dittus and Prowse (1996, for 1990 data), and OECD (1995 for 1993 data).
51Table A.3.1  Legal and Regulatory Constraints on Corporate Control
Institution  United  States  United  Kingdom  Japan  Germany
Banks  Stock  ownership  Bank  of England  Prior  to 1987  banks No restrictions,
prohibited  or requires  may  discourage  could  hold  up  to  apart  from
prior  approval  of FRB  ownership  on  100/o  of a firm's  some  generous
and  must  be  "passive".  prudential  stock.  After 1987  prudential
Source:  Glass-Steagall  grounds.  Capital  can  hold  up  to 5%.  rules.
and  BHC  Act.  adequacy  rules  Source:  Anti-
discourage  large  monopoly  Act.
stakes.
Life Insurance  Can  hold  up  to  2%  of  Self-imposed  Can  hold  up  to  Can  hold  up  to
companies  assets  in a single  firm's  limits  on  fund  10%  of a firm's  20%  of total
securities.  Can  hold  up  assets  invested  in  stock.  Source:  assets  in
to 20%  of assets  in  any  one  company  Anti-monopoly  equities.
equities.  Source:  NY  stemming  from  Act.  Source:
Insurance  Law  fiduciary  Insurance  Law.
requirement  of
liquidity.
Other  Insurers  Control  of non  insurance Same  as  above.  Same  as  above.  No restrictions.
company  prohibited  by
NY Insurance  Law.
Mutual  Funds  Tax  penalties  and  Cannot  take  large  No restrictions.  No restrictions.
regulatory  restrictions  if  stakes  in firrns.
ownership  exceeds  10%  Source:  Financial
of a firm's stock.  Source: Services  Act,
Investment  Company  1986.
.____________  Act, IRS.
Pension  Funds  Must  diversify.  Self-imposed  No restrictions.  No  restrictions.
Source:  ERISA.  limits  on  fund





General  SEC  notification  Insider  trading  Regulatory
required  for 5%  laws  discourage  notification
ownership.  Antitrust  large  stakeholders  required  for
laws  prohibit  vertical  from  exerting  25%
restraints.  Insider  control.  ownership.
trading  laws  Source:  Insider
discouraging  active  Dealing  Act.
shareholding.  Creditor
in control  of firm liable
to  subordination  of its
loans.
Source:  Bankruptcy  case
law.
Source:  Prowse  1994, p. 17-18.
52Table  A.4.1: Czech Republic:  Ownership  and Firm  Performance  Statistics
(all in percentages)
First Wave  Second Wave
Category  1992  1993  1994  1995 1  1993  1994  1995
A. Average  Firm Ownership  Share  by  Sponsor*
Bank  Sponsored  Investment  Funds  23.1  23.8  19.8  21.2  5.8  7.8  9.8
(15.4)  (15.5)  (17.2)  (18.4)  (8.6)  (11.2)  (13.6)
Non-Bank  Sponsored  Investment  23.8  24.6  26.1  27.6  31.0  30.3  30.9
Funds  (14.1)  (13.9)  (17.4)  (19.5)  (14.1)  (15.4)  (16.4)
Local  Strategic  Investors  0.1  0.1  5.1  6.2  2.1  6.3  7.6
(0.2)  (0.2)  (11.1)  (13.3)  (8.1)  (14.9)  (17.0)
Foreign  Strategic  Investors  0.0  0.0  2.9  4.3  1.0  1.2  2.4
(0.0)  (0.0)  (10.6)  (13.3)  (2.6)  (6.4)  (10.2)
National  Property  Fund  2.4  2.1  1.2  0.9  7.6  6.7  5.4
(7.4)  (7.1)  (5.7)  (0.4)  (17.5)  (16.6)  (15.6)
Total  49.5  50.9  53.9  60.2  46.9  45.8  55.9
(15.0)  (14.2)  (14.7)  (16.1)  (19.9)  (17.4)  (21.1)
B. Concentration  indicators*
2  1993  I994  IS  Panel
Share  of top  5 investors  49.5  48.9  49.6  57.8  52.1
(15.0)  (12.7)  (15.8)  (17.5)  (14.9)
Herfindahl'Index  0.076  0.085  0.109  0.134  0.106
(0.057)  (0.081)  (0.104)  (0.125)  (0.104)
C. Firm performance  indicators'
1992  1993  1994  199s  Panel
Tobin's  Q  96.7  80.3  78.2  76.9  81.2
(52.4)  (50.1)  (44.1)  (46.3)  (48.2)
Profitability  12.1  13.7  15.1  17.1  14.8
(11.4)  (11.6)  (11.3)  (12.6)  (11.9)
Correlation  (Tobin'sQ:  Profitability)  15.1  23.1  26.9  27.2  21.8
a  Standard  Deviation  in Parentheses.  Residual  ownership  is  by  individuals  and  smaller  investment  funds.
Source:  Claessens,  Djankov and Pohl 1996.
53Table A.4.2: Czech Republic: Ownership and Governance, Estimation Results*
(random effects estimates)
Explanatory  Variable  Regression  i  Regression ii  Regression iii
Tobin's  Q  Profit  Tobin's  Q  Profit  Tobin's  Q  ProGit
Lcverage  0.073  -0.002  0.072  -0.002  0.074  -0.002
(15.588)^  (1.367)  (15.536)'  (1.267)  (15.564)"  (1.288)
Dummy  for First  Wave  0.418  0.059  0.457  0.054  0.498  0.051
(1.026)  (0.568)  (1.148)  (0.528)  (1.247)  (0.495)
Concentration  (Herfindahl  Index)  0.067  0.038  0.135  0.031  0.121  0.032
(I.741)'**  (1.668)0**  (0.878)  (0.752)  (0.795)  (0.781)
Bank Sponsored  IPFs  0.221  0.009  0.182  0.012
(2.735)**  (0.384)  (2.189)*  (0.542)
Non-Bank  Sponosred  IPFs  0.025  0.028  0.024  0.029
(0.296)  (1.207)  (0.274)  (1.215)
National  Property  Fund  0.377  0.037  0.377  0.037
(3.041)*  (1.119)  (3.051)"  (1.124)
Local  Strategic  Investors  -0.045  0.067  -0.051  0.067
(0.395)  (2.145)**  (0.445)  (2.167)"
Foreign  Strategic  Investors  -0.074  0.059  -0.082  0.061
(0.542)  (1.659)*-*  (0.612)  (1.678)0*0
Conflict-of-interest  Dummy  0.058  -0.005
(2.142)"  (0.741)
Sector  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year  Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R-squares  0.138  0.088  0.149  0.092  0.153  0.094
- All regressions  are based on an unbalanced  panel  of 2490 observations. t-statistics  in
parentheses.
**  Significant  at the 99%  level.
*  Significant  at the 90% level.
Source:  Claessens,  Djankov  and Pohl 1996.
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